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SUMMARY 
South African society is currently negotiating a new future. As a result, the sense of 
identity amongst all groups in South Africa may be undergoing change. This dissertation 
attempts to identify what type of sense of identity exists in pupils in four different school 
environments. These schools ranged from a racially integrated to an isolated and ra-
cially separate school. A review of the traditional literature on the self (or sense of 
identity), reveals that it does not allow for the possibility of change in a sense of identity, 
or the role that language and the social environment plays in the development of a sense 
of identity. As a result, Harrean and Sampsonian type thinking was used as the theoreti-
cal base of the research. Further, discourse analysis was the method of research used. 
Different schools were found to exhibit different senses of identity, and the implications of 
this are discussed. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCfiON 
South African society is uniquely diverse, being composed as it is of different groups split 
along educational, ethnic, language, religious, political, social and economic lines. Each 
of these groups has traditionally exhibited its own sense of identity, which in turn, has al-
lowed individuals to function in a society from a secure and stable base. However, 
recent political and social developments in South Africa are effecting changes in the very 
fabric of society, and along with this, changes in the sense of identity that various groups 
hold. 
It is essential to understand that different systems are linked by interacting forces, and 
that change in one will lead to changes in others, and eventually adaptive action occurs 
throughout a system or society (Schoemann, 1981). Communities should be viewed as 
multidimensional and social change in any one level will reverberate through all the dif-
ferent levels (Greider, Krannich & Berry, 1991). 
Historically, South Africa has been a society partitioned artificially along racial lines. As 
apartheid is dismantled, contact between different racial and cultural groups is increas-
ing. However, the patterns of a society long and deeply embedded in apartheid will not 
change overnight. A process of communication and negotiation - on a social as well as 
a political level - has begun in order to create a new moral order with new social rules. 
Such rules will develop and be negotiated between groups, since a society that hopes to 
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function in an orderly and adequate manner, needs them to govern behaviours and 
norms. In addition, the rules will be sensitive to the interests of all groups. Psychologists 
can contribute to creating a new ordered society by trying to identify the subtle rules 
operating within the diverse moral orders of that society. We need to be ready to im-
prove our knowledge about society in order to fit into a new society, and to operate func-
tionally within that society (McGurk, 1988). 
Lonergan (1958) has noted that a correlative common dimension exists in a society, in 
which the transcendental precepts are toward a community with higher values and a 
more spiritual unity. In other words, societies tend to exist as part of a continual 
process, developing toward a more optimal level of functioning. This is true of South 
Africa, and out of fragmentation a new whole must develop, in which groups which have 
exchanged information and engaged in a process of open communication and nego-
tiation, will no longer exist as different groups, but as part of a larger more functional unit. 
Social integration is the conscious, knowing and deliberated participation of several cul-
tures in a process of fusion. However, certain preconditions must exist. Prerequisite to 
the process of social integration is the commonality of interests between groups, the 
mutual capacity to understand each other, and the direct presence of all groups in the 
agencies of power (Galessi, 1984). 
According to Rank (1941) there is an eternal question regarding social change: which is 
better: a change in the people themselves or, a change in their system of living? 
However, this is not necessarily a relevant question. Neither option is better than the 
other. What is needed is the the ability to live in, and flow with, events (McGurk, 1990). 
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This allows for a creative response to social change. As McGurk concludes: "the future 
is not predetermined, (we must admit) that the future can be created, and that the future 
emerges as the combined process of many different types of strategic initiative in various 
societal functions, that come to be systematically united" (McGurk, 1990, p.4). 
Creating a new moral order is a self-correcting process of learning and mutual encultura-
tion in which communication overwhelms the alienating past by being situated in the 
"practical, here-and-now" context (McGurk, 1990). The practical and real situation will 
become important, and all social rules will move and develop towards a level of optimal 
functioning- that is, a level in which no one group is threatened, and a mutually benefi-
cial exchange occurs. Common aspirations become the goal, and are attained. 
As customs, practices and institutions converge, social exchange occurs, and from this 
exchange new moral orders will grow (Alexander, 1990). One result of this will be the 
development of a new sense of identity in society. This new sense of identity will reflect 
the new moral order, and will be based partly on previous identity, and partly on the 
demands of the current environment. Every individual's sense of identity is firmly rooted 
in his social group - and if the group's identity is changing because of the development 
of a new moral order (as in South Africa), his own sense of identity will also be affected. 
Thus, it can be seen that social changes in this country will be reflected on an individual 
level - as to how a person defines himself. 
The aim of this dissertation is to study the sense of identity exhibited by different groups 
in the changing moral order of South Africa. Sense of identity, or the self, was chosen as 
the object of study because it is framed and represented by the social environment, and 
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thus it is in a unique position to reflect the way individuals who are part of a social group 
construe their identity within the wider social milieu (Gergen, 1981, 1985, 1989; Harre, 
1979, 1983a; Shotter, 1989; Shweder & LeVine, 1984). Social identity is one of the most 
fundamental constructs underlying the manifestation of intergroup behaviour, and is thus 
of crucial importance in South Africa where issues relating to intergroup relations form a 
core aspect of South African society. Psychology in South Africa has been dominated 
by such issues. In a survey conducted in 1980 by the Human Sciences Research 
Council, it emerged that intergroup relations were identified by researchers as the most 
important research area in South Africa (Louw & Foster, 1991). The effects of the crucial 
changes in relations between groups in South Africa must therefore be studied in detail, 
and following from this, the changes within cultural groups, most especially those of 
identity, need to be looked at. 
For the purpose of this study, the term "sense of identity" will be used in place of "self" or 
"ego". There is no clear discrimination in the literature between these three terms - they 
seem to refer to the same concept, and the theoretical orientation of the author(s) deter-
mines which description is used. The "self" as a term is more popular in the majority of 
the literature available on this topic. However, as a result of the theoretical bias of this 
study, the term "sense of identity" will be used, except when reviewing and discussing 
literature that uses the term "self". 
In the actual research, the sense of identity of black and white South Africans in different 
high schools was examined. The school was chosen as the environment for the study 
because it is the one situation in a plural society where contact between different groups 
can take place without undue stress, and where this contact can lead to positive attitude 
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change (Galessi, 1984; Holdstock, 1987). Schools in South Africa are in a unique posi-
tion in that they have as recently as 1990 become "open". Thus, they could be said to be 
a mirror of unfolding moral orders and the resultant changes in sense of identity that may 
be occuring in South Africa, as new rules and a new way of life are forged. 
Each school chosen has had different levels and types of contact with, and exposure to, 
various social groups in South Africa. They vary from a single race, sheltered rural com-
munity school, to an urban school that has been fully integrated on all levels for a long 
period of time. 
A review of the relevant literature on the self or sense of identity will be presented, fol-
lowed by the theoretical orientation of this study. Finally, the methods and results of the 
study will be outlined, followed by a discussion on the results, and a conclusion. 
This is not a hypothesis-proving study. Rather, it is a hypothesis-generating study in that 
it will simply seek to determine what types of sense of identity exists in various groups, 
as the moral order in South Africa undergoes extensive change, and new rules develop. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
A MET APERSPECTIVE OF THE SELF AND I OR SENSE OF IDENTITY 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will cover a history of the development of enquiry into the self, a discussion 
of the basic concepts and terms used in connection with the self and sense of identity, 
and a metatheoretical discussion of the various approaches to the self and sense of 
identity. It must be emphasised that this is a metaperspective, and that different theories 
will be clustered together. The grouping used in identifying the different approaches to 
the self has been commonly used in the literature. For example, Shweder and Miller 
( 1985) have clustered theories as: realist theories in which control is vested in the exter-
nal environment, innatist theories in which individuals are the centre of control, and, 
finally, social constructionism. 
The majority of the traditional literature covered in this chapter uses the term "self" to 
describe what is regarded as a stable disposition. In chapters two and three I will 
similarly use the term "self" in discussing the literature on this subject. However, in chap-
ter four I will switch to using the term "sense of identity", as this allows for the possiblity of 
restructuring concept of the self. This restructuring is achieved in terms of cultural ex-
periences, and allows one to introduce the idea of fluidity into the construction of the self. 
"Self" and "sense of identity" have been used synonomously in the literature. However, 
"self" refers to a stable concept of personhood, whereas "sense of identity" refers to an 
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ongoing and continuous process of action and interaction. Chapter four will more clearly 
outline and define the differences between the two, but, it must be borne in mind that in 
the next two chapters I will use the term "self". As will become clear, its use is justified in 
terms of the type of approaches that have been taken to the self in the past. Further, 
research conducted in this mode reflects the idea of self as a stable cognitive disposi-
tion. 
2.1.1. Definitions of the Self 
A definition of the term "self" has yet to be agreed upon. Different theorists approach the 
self in different ways, and therefore utilize and outline different criteria. However, it is 
possible to identify six primary intentions of the users of the term "self". The self is seen 
as an inner agent with controlling and directing functions over motives, fears and needs. 
Thus, the self is an inner witness to events, and becomes the totality of an individual's 
personal experiences and expressions. Also, the self is an organised personal whole, a 
synthesized unit, as well as a conscious and aware unit. Finally, the self is seen as an 
abstract goal or end point to which every individual strives. The first five characteristics 
of the self can be regarded as existing aspects of one's personhood, whereas the last 
characteristic is a potential of personhood. 
Smith (1978, 1985) has defined selfhood as being self-aware or self-reflective, and being 
or having a body. This involves somehow taking into account the boundaries of 
selfhood at birth and death and feeling a continuity of identity in between; placing oneself 
in a generational sequence and network of other connected selves as forebears and de-
scendents and relatives; being in partial communication and communion with other con-
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temporary selves while experiencing an irreducible separateness of experience and 
identity; engaging in joint and individual enterprises in the world with some degree of 
forethought and afterthought; guiding what one does and appraising what one has done 
at least partly through reflection on one's performance; and, feeling responsible for 
one's actions and holding others responsible for theirs. 
The following discussion of the history of, and approaches to the self will reveal how the 
definitions given to the self differ, as they depend on the theoretical orientation 
presented. 
2.1.2. A History of the Self 
The importance of an adequate theory of self for any complete account of human social 
behaviour has long been recognised (Hull & Levy, 1979). In his history of the self, Mauss 
(1954) has traced the evolution of distinct selfhood, as differentiated from nature and cul-
ture. The concept of a self-conscious moral actor began to solidify in the centuries 
preceding the Common Era. Mauss writes of the transition from the notion of persona -
man invested with a status - to the notion of man as such, of the human person. The 
meaning of persona evolved from "mask" or "role" to the present notion of a human 
being with an individual nature. The notion of an individual who is conscious, 
autonomous and free emerged with Greek philosophy and Roman law. However, it was 
only in the 18th and 19th centuries that the concept of person became the category of 
self. 
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Jaynes ( 1976) disagrees with Mauss, and argues that consciousness did not emerge 
until the first millenium B.C., a few thousand years after the development of agriculture. 
However, Kitagawa (1967) provides contradictory evidence by showing that the classical 
religions of the Near East, Far East, India, Greece and Rome, which began around the 
4th millenium B.C., recognised the distinction between man, society and nature; they all 
derogated the phenomenal world, and the empirical self was denigrated, as compared to 
the religious self. 
Modernization has produced a self-oriented individual who internalizes authority, cultural 
values, and structure of meaning. Prior to the industrial revolution the self was collective, 
and based on traditional kinship ties. Religion ruled life, with an omniscient God as the 
controlling authority. With the advent of the industrial revolution all this changed as in-
dividuals became rooted in economic roles and a material society. Individuation oc-
cured, along with the importance of having a sense of individual competence and ef-
ficacy. Shared meanings collapsed and the transmission of communal collectivist ideals 
gradually died (Westen, 1985). 
The classical literature on the social origin of the self addresses such issues as the self 
as subject and object, the social nature of the self, the unity of the self, the actual versus 
the potential or ideal self, and the question of self-worth (Baldwin, 1895; Cooley, 1902; 
James, 1890; Mead, 1934). In modern western society, the first real attempt at defining 
the self was that of William James (1890). He divided the self into two: subject and ob-
ject (the "I" and "Me": self as knower, or self as object of thought). In other words, the 
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self could be both a subject and an object to itself. This duality has formed the basis for 
much of the work done on the self. James later further subdivided the "Me" part of the 
self into spriritual, material, social and bodily aspects. 
Following james, the next attempt at working with the self was that of Cooley (1902). 
Unlike James, who emphasized the individual and the inner self, he emphasized the so-
cial milieu. In this vein he developed the well known "looking glass self", that is, the 
individual's conception of self is determined by the perception of other people's reac-
tions to him. 
The next important step in the discussion of the self was taken by an anthropologist -
George Mead (1934). Mead regarded the self as an essentially social phenomenon, and 
emphasized the process of self-reference. He, like James, divided the self into two: the 
"I" and the "Me". The "I" relates to the individual asserting his own uniqueness, and the 
"Me" becomes focal in interchanges with the ingroup and other people. 
The next major development in the psychology of the self came with Freud and the 
psychoanalytic movement. Freud (1938) developed his well known concepts of the id, 
ego and superego, and frequently confused the self with the ego. Essentially they ap-
pear to be the same- a realistic and mediated adaptation to the world. 
Johnson (1985) notes that the history of the Western self has progressed through three 
stages. Firstly, pre-Christian until 1850: this stage was characterized by philosophical, 
literary and theological descriptions of the self (using the concepts of soul and mind) 
stressing the individual nature of intersubjecti~e consciousness, the ontological 
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separateness of both person and thing, and the tendency to locate responsibility for ac-
tion in the individual. The next stage occured betwen 1850 and 1940, and saw the refine-
ment of the self as a concept in psychology and the elaboration of the social self in sym-
bolic interactionism as defined by Mead. The final stage occurred from 1940, and .is on-
going. In this period, a number of directions have appeared, which include looking at 
aspects of the self in highly operationalised ways; the development of a holistic frame of 
reference, which is associated with the existensialist and phenomenological approaches 
in psychology, and the current movement toward a convergence of different disciplines. 
Finally, Sampson (1989b) has proposed a history of personhood and the self, based on 
Habermas' terms, which represents ideological constructs in the development of the self. 
The first stage is the primitive stage, in which the self was determined by kinship and kin-
ship ties. In the second stage these ties and the family were replaced by the bureacratic 
apparatus, which defined the self in terms of role. Following on this, the liberal stage 
developed, which saw the rise of the civil society, which, while emphasizing the rights 
and freedom of the individual, was in fact controlled by market forces. The final stage is 
that of advanced capitalism, in which state intervention increases, thus narrowing in-
dividual choice, while still allowing for belief in autonomy. 
One can in fact see threads or similarities between Johnson's third stage and 
Sampson's last two stages. In the recent history of the self, there have been many 
highly specialised ways of looking at and describing the self (Johnson, 1985). Such 
developments may in fact be seen as logical outcomes of the liberal and capitalist tradi-
tions of society, which emphasize such specialization (Sampson, 1989b). And yet, as 
pointed out, there is a narrowing and convergence of disciplines and approaches, and a 
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more holistic approach to the self and life in general. The state intervention of the ad-
vanced capitalist stage would be similar to this - as an overall "umbrella" type action. 
That is, one agency controls everything, and everything is linked to a whole. This is very 
similar to the holistic approach emphasized by Johnson. 
2.1.3. Basic Concepts and Terms 
2.1.3.1. Dimensions of self 
There appears to be agreement among the various theorists that man is a social, cultural 
and moral being. He is therefore required to recognise some locus of responsibility for 
his actions in society. This in turn implies some kind of self-awareness, self-appraisal 
and a concept of self that permits attitudes directed towards the self as an object (Lock, 
1981). 
It would appear from the literature that four particular dimensions of the self have 
received attention and debate. They may be identified as fact versus construct, subject 
versus object, structure versus process, and single versus multiple (Gordon & Gergen, 
1968). There appears to be consensus in realizing that the self is a multiple process 
which is always changing, and that it can be a fact, a construct, a subject or an object, 
depending on the context. Many theorists in fact see the self as a trinity: that is, it is an 
actor, information processor and the object of schemata. 
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Baumeister ( 1986, 1987) has divided the self into two basic categories: the private and 
the public self, which reflect some of the abovementioned constructs. The private self is 
phenomenological experience; it only acts for itself; the actor controls access to informa-
tion regarding the self; and, the self acts in the interest of a limited number of people. In 
contrast, the public self is seen in observable behaviour; it acts as an agent of others; in-
formation about the self is not controlled by the actor; and, the actor acts in the interest 
of the community (Tedeschi, 1986). 
In relation to the latter point Trilling (1973) has distinguished between sincerity and 
authenticity in the self's relationship with others. Sincerity refers to the relationship be-
tween words, intentions and deeds. Authenticity refers to whether or not the person is 
who he appears to be. 
Neisser (1988) has described five kinds of self which he sees to be relevant, and which 
partially elaborate on Baumeister's dualistic distinction. They are the ecological self, that 
is, the self engaged in the physical environment; the interpersonal self, which is engaged 
in human interaction; the extended self, which is based on specific experiences; the 
private self, which is based on uniqueness; and finally, the conceptual self, which draws 
on a network of theories and assumptions in which the self is embedded. 
2.1.3.2. Universality of the self 
One aspect of the self that has received a great deal of debate is its universality. This will 
receive attention further on, but a few points must be stated here. Hallowell (1967) 
believed that the self is universal in that people are likely to develop an understanding of 
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themselves as physically distinct and separable from others. Heelas and Lock (1981) 
have said that the self is highly culture specific, but two very broad universals can be 
identified. Firstly, one can refer to a boundary between the self and the non-self, and 
secondly, the location of power in societies. However, the position of each will vary from 
culture to culture. Triandis (1978) has agreed that universals exist. But, in the final 
analysis social behaviour is under the influence of fundamental attitudes and values, fil-
tered by a person's conceptions of what he is capable of doing and what he considers 
appropriate and pleasant to do, and likely to lead to desired goal states. Different 
aspects of the self are likely to be highly culture specific (Markus, in print) for example, 
motivation, emotion and cognition. 
2.1.3.3. A justification for the study of the self 
Breakwell (1983) raised four questions surrounding the concept of the self. The first 
question concerns the definition of the term self. She notes that identity, self, character 
and personality are used interchangeably in the literature. Clear and universally ap-
plicable distinctions are difficult to make. The use of a particular term is usually based 
on a philosophy of science and this too makes for further difficulties. However, all 
theorists appear to agree on an inherent duality in the concept: self is used as something 
to be explored, and something which can be used to explain why things occur. 
A second concern for Breakwell is to justify why self should be studied. Firstly, and 
simply, the self is studied in order to explain and predict an individual's behaviour. Thus 
the emphasis in such an approach is on an explanation of personality and behaviour. 
However, this explanation can be seen to be insufficient, and as a result there has been 
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a move to focus on the social environment as well. Currently, there is a growing concern 
regarding the dialectical relationship between the self and the social context (e.g. Ger-
gen, 1985; Harre, 1979, 1983a; Harre & Secord, 1972). 
Breakwell notes that an issue of central relevance in studying the self is whether or not 
the individual is autonomous or an automaton. There is as yet no synthesis of this 
debate, with perhaps the exception of social constructionism and Harre's approach to 
the self, which will be discussed in detail later in this dissertation. Psychoanalysis and 
social learning theory represent extremes of approaches to the question. 
Another issue of importance is to understand in what ways the personal and social self 
are distinct. To answer this question three subdivisions should be made. 
Firstly, the constituent parts of the self, which are based on the split between subject and 
object should be defined. A way of doing so is to distinguish between self-concept ver-
sus self-evaluation; self-as-subject versus self-as-object; spiritual self versus social self; 
and ideal self versus real self. 
A second way of conceiving the split is to follow Mead in the distinction between the "I" 
and the "Me". Or, Goffman's (1961) extreme position can be noted. He states that 
people adopt short term roles, which are specific only to the situation they are in; there-
fore, they are forgotten as the actor moves on. Such a distinction leads to a problem in 
ascertaining how a personal self (self-concept, self-as-subject, spritual self, ideal self) 
can be defined without taking recourse to the social self (self-evaluation, self-as-object). 
It is difficult to see how personal identity can be defined except in terms of social history 
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and context. Social identity alone does not account for a unique individual. So far, the 
literature has shown that the only way to look at whether both exist is to study role con-
flict (e.g., mother versus businesswoman). 
A final issue remains, and concerns the genesis or development of the personal self. 
Basically, the personal self seems to evolve through the social self, the latter providing 
templates or structures for self-conceptions. However, the social self also interacts with 
inner processes. Thus a continuing process of learning and change occurs. 
Breakwell's ideas lead one to discern a fundamental issue in studying the self. This con-
cerns the relationship between the self as "I" and the self as "Us". It seems clear that this 
relationship is of central concern. 
By concentrating on this issue allowance is made for statements as expresed by 
Johnson (1985). Self can be seen as a social construction, which evolves through the 
use of social symbols and signals. Paradoxically, self can also be seen as a 
phenomenological object to be studied through action. Whichever way one looks at the 
self it is clear that theories of self are situational and can be studied in naturalistic set-
tings. Also, self is a construct referring to interaction; it deals with interpersonal and in-
tersubjective experience. Since this is so, the concept of communication becomes im-
portant in the study of self or sense of identity. 
Although self can be viewed in social terms, one cannot divest self from bodily exerience. 
It is involved in real encounters- yet subject to direction from unobservable forces. 
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2.1.3.4. Language and the self 
Finally, Johnson (1983) notes that language is central to the construction of the self. 
Language represents the way we see and formulate our social and cultural world. It is 
the medium through which we communicate with one another, and has been shown to 
affect cognition (Au, 1983; Bloom, 1984; Festinger, 1954). If the self is socially con-
structed, language will play a major role in how it is developed and expressed. The way 
in which the self is expressed will be constrained by language. But, language will also af-
fect the very construction of the self, as it is through language that self-conscious ac-
tions, and reflections from the generalised other occur. One's self is constructed and 
reinforced through communication- through language. The importance of language will 
be discussed in further detail in the section on social constructionism. 
2.2. THEORIES OF THE SELF 
2.2.1. Individualist and Cognitive Approaches 
2.2.1.1. Self as agent: the inner self 
The assumption that the individualist and cognitive theories make is that the self (or ego) 
is the centre of all action and control in an individual (Lapsley & Power, 1988). The self 
plays a prime role as a mediator between the basic drives and social reality. In in-
dividualist models intrapsychic and unconscious processes are emphasized. Such 
processes and the topic of self-knowledge were largely ignored in the initial writings on 
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the self, but with the advent of psychoanalysis this changed, as concepts such as the 
ego, repression and defense mechanisms came to the fore. Further, such models also 
began to emphasize an achievement of selfhood through autonomy, separation and in-
dependence (Sass, 1988). 
Freud's (1938) psychoanalytic model formed the basis for the individualist approaches to 
the self. Freud emphasized the unconscious and inner processes which controlled ac-
tion in an individual. A modern version of such an individualist approach is presented by 
Epstein, whose cognitive analysis of the self focuses on the intrapsychic processes that 
result in social behaviour (Epstein, 1981). In an earlier conceptualization, Hull's drive 
reduction model postulated that the behaviour of the organism is influenced by the 
operation of internal drives or tension like states that seek reduction or relief (Hull, 1943). 
Freud's disciples (e.g., Horney, 1950) all continued to emphasize the inner self. In all 
their theories the individual and the self are the actors on the world. 
2.2.1.2. The development of self 
Psychodynamic thinking enjoyed a shift in the works of Kohut (1977, 1982) and Winnicott 
(1965), although they still held an individual orientation (Honess & Yardley, 1987). Much 
work in the tradition of Kohut and Winnicott has been done on the self, especially in the 
development of the self, and an examination of this work reveals how the inner self has 
predominated as the focus of interest. Winnicott ascribed a vital role to the quality of 
mother-infant interaction in the development of the self. The inner, true, self develops 
through the caretaker's emphasizing the continuity of being. Thus, the self comes into 
being only after the ego nuclei are gathered together through good mothering 
27 
(Harwood, 1987). In a similar vein, Kohut (1977) notes that the self exists at birth, but it 
is intrinsically part of the human intersubjective environment. This intersubjectivity 
develops through different kinds of mergers between the self and the self I object. The 
healthy childhood development of the self results from a process Kohut refers to as 
"transmuting internalization", which he based on the concept of "optimal frustration". The 
latter represents a failure in empathy: it is a temporary breakdown in the self and self I 
object relationships, which generates the evolution of the self (Ashbury, 1990). Kohut 
also further developed the concept of the bipolar self, in which ambition and ideals are 
mediated through a tension arc. 
In a similar vein, the work of Pines emphasizes a core psychodynamic concept, that of 
mirroring in the infant (Pines, 1987). This is said to lead to the development of the self. A 
baby appears to be endowed with particular psychological characteristics, which in-
fluence the unconscious of the caretaker in interaction, thus resulting in a reinforcement 
of the innate self of the baby. If this fails, the false self develops, that is, structures which 
rely on external sources of affirmation and vitality in order to function (Price, 1987). The 
result of this is that affect comes under the control of the other, and hypervigilance and a 
pre-occupation with the other's reactions replace spontaneity in the individual. 
A further prerequisite for the development of the self in childhood is conceived through 
perception of self-constancy, thus reflecting a cognitive orientation to the self. Aboud 
and Ruble (1987) have noted that the experienced internal environment is important to a 
sense of continuity of being. This continuity is based on three neo-Piagetian steps: the 
expectation of sameness (pre-operational stage); the perceived constancy of essential 
features (concrete operational stage); and, the perception of stability and consistency 
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(formal operations stage). A similar theory is presented by Noam (1988), who attempted 
to develop a theory which links neo-Piagetian theories of social cognition with neo-
psychoanalytic accounts of object relations. Likewise, Greenwald (1988) has linked the 
developmental stages of levels of representational complexity in an individual to Piaget's 
theories of the stages of development. 
According to Stern (1985) infants first develop a sense of emergent self. This sense of 
self involves the subjective social experiences of the baby, and forms the foundation of 
subsequent stages of self-development. When the baby's diverse experiences begin to 
connect, a sense of organization within the self begins to emerge. His memories of af-
fect, physical descriptions and physiological sensations begin to form reference points 
from which the sense of a core self develops. Stern holds that the sense of self and 
capacity for relatedness becomes enlarged and increasingly elaborated as development 
proceeds. Stern also identifies four different senses of self: emergent, core (or physical 
self), subjective and verbal. Each of these senses of self has a formative period in the 
first three years of life (Weinberg, 1991). 
Bowlby's (1969) attachment theory regards the self in a similar manner to Winnicott, 
Kohut and Stern. All stress that the infant is prepared to engage in social relations from 
birth and that maternal responsiveness is crucial. However, Bowlby has gone one step 
further in proposing that, in the course of interacting with the physical and personal 
world, an individual constructs "internal working models" of important aspects of that 
world. The function of such models is to aid the individual in perceiving and interpreting 
events, in forecasting the future and in constructing plans. These models emerge out of 
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actual patterns of infant-caregiver transactions, and can therefore only be understood in 
terms of the relationship(s) within which they emerged and continue to develop 
(Bretherton, 1991). 
2.2.1.3. Self and context: identity formation from the inside out 
One very important theorist on the self has been Erikson (1950), on whose ideas many 
of the Western concepts of self are based. Erikson, although not ignoring social and cul-
tural influences, believed that behaviour is motivated by drives and psycho-social crises. 
The self is present at birth, and develops through several stages into a controlling and 
organising influence. An example of how Erikson's views have come to seen to be im-
portant, is his view of the adolescent crisis, which is now firmly embedded in the Western 
view of the self. The process of identity formation emerges as an evolving configuration -
a configuration which is gradually established by successive ego syntheses and resyn-
theses throughout childhood. By adolescence, the individual is experimenting with 
various identites before he finally establishes his adult identity. The adolescent enters a 
stage known as the "psychosocial moratorium" in which he is neither an adult nor a child, 
but is allowed to experiment. 
Numerous other theorists have relied on psychodynamic thinking to explain the self. For 
example: Marcia (1987) claims that the self is achieved through exploration and commit-
ment, as well as being based on patterns of familial relations (a central psychoanalytic 
concept); Epstein (1973) has given an impressive array of theoretical and empirical 
evidence to suppport his contention that one of the basic needs of the individual is for 
unity or cohererence in his I her conceptual system- inherent psychological tendencies 
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explain the distinction between the true and the spurious; Allport (1937) synthesizes ego 
and self-construct through his concept of "proprium", which is said to be innate and con-
trolling of action; Maslow (1954) presents a self-actualization model, jourard (1964) em-
phasizes self-cathexis, and Rogers (1951) constructed his client-centred therapy which 
dealt exclusively with the self and self-acceptance or "integration". 
2.2.1.4. The self as a stable structure 
Much of the original psychodynamic thinking was not particularly concerned with the 
cognitive aspects of the self, or how the self is represented. Abundant work has 
changed its emphasis towards one of cognitivism. In fact, such research overwhelms 
the current body of literature on the self. Much of this research will be summarised later 
in this chapter, but a few examples will suffice here. 
Epstein (1981) contends that the self concept or internal working model of the self is best 
understood as part of an individual's theory of reality. A self-theory therefore consists of 
several hierarchically organised postulate systems into which new experiences are as-
similated. These can be translated into schematic hierarchies. 
The self is often conceived of as a system of schemata (eg., Markus, 1977). These 
schemata (e.g. self as teacher, mother, athlete) are connected to the self in varying de-
grees. Each schema is a generalization about what the self is like, and constrains trait 
and behavioural information and inferences. Thus, the self has multiple aspects, 
variously associated with one another. The existence of any hierarchically arrayed sub-
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selves means that different aspects of the self can be accessible at any given time. Fur-
ther, existing self-concept determines what new knowledge is sought, and how 
knowledge is interpreted (Sherman, Judd & Park, 1989). 
Other cognitively oriented formulations pertaining to the self relate to the nature of cogni-
tive processing. The self is believed by some to possess a stable core, as well as a 
phenomenal or working self (Cantor, Markus, Niedenthal & Nurius, 1986). Thus, there is 
no single or average self-image continuously changing, but, rather, a collection of self-
images whose relative accessibilities change. Cognitive mapping is the formation, 
development and maintenance of the self, and can therefore be seen to be important. 
Zavalloni (1973, 1975) emphasizes that categorization of social identity elements is the 
result of recoding processes, through which experience and reality are transformed into 
images and thoughts and selectively stored in long term memory. Similarly, Hull and 
Levy (1979) present a cognitive model of the organization of the self, in which it is sug-
gested that self-awareness phenomena are a function of a particular form of informa-
tional encoding. 
2.2.1.5. Conclusion 
In summary therefore, cognitive approaches to the self have attempted to identify the 
mental structures and processes involved in the formation and maintenance of the self. 
The individualist and cognitive approaches to the self emphasize a stable, yet working, 
inner, controlling, and cognitive agent. There are variations in emphases in this group, 
but three broad assumptions may be identified (Semin & Gergen, 1990). Firstly, there is 
a shared commitment to the view that the cognitive world is in some way sensitive to, 
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correspondent with, or reflective of, events within the objective world. In addition, the 
cognitive system is seen as playing a major role in the production of behaviour. And, 
finally, language is believed to be guided by cognition. 
On another level, Kirshner (1991) has pointed out that such approaches also have im-
portant philosophical underpinnings. They reflect traditional philosophical questions -
notably of a homuncular self internal to consciouness, and the isolation of the subject 
from other selves. However, other approaches to the self reflect entirely different con-
cerns, as will become apparent in the next sections. 
2.2.2. Svmbolic Interactionism 
Symbolic interactionism was primarily defined by Mead (1934), and is basically a 
sociogenic view of human cognition. In this approach, the self is seen as a pivotal con-
cept in the symbolic interaction analysis of human behaviour and social relationships. 
The self has two distinct but related meanings: process and object. As a process, the 
self involves alternating states of consciousness (Mead's "I" and "Me"); as an object, it 
involves humans acting towards themselves. The self is neither concrete nor tangible. It 
is a process, and in the final analysis it is observable only in behaviour. It is the posses-
sion of self that makes it possible for human beings to control their own conduct (Hewit, 
1984). The control is evident in that we can select the acts in which we will engage be-
cause we can imagine ourselves engaging in them, and because we can imagine the 
social responses they will earn. Because we objectify ourselves, we can more or less 
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control what we do. Yet, it is also the possession of self that makes human beings sus-
ceptible to social controls in a human fashion. Therefore, how we come to have selves 
lies in society. 
The creation of the self imports society into the individual in various ways. The dialogue 
between "I" and "Me" is an internal representation of conversations that are possible in 
the real world. Also, our capacity to imagine our own possible lines of conduct is limited 
by the social acts that we are capable of imagining. Further, we become subjects to our-
selves by taking the role perspectives of others, through the process of role taking; 
therefore, the kinds of self-objectifications that are possible depend on the roles that are 
socially available. The self is an important and highly valued object - others being equal, 
we seek to behave in ways that will preserve, protect and defend ourselves. Finally, the 
self incorporates the moral standards of the society as a whole, or of that part of the 
society of which one is a member. 
According to the symbolic interactionists, there is no self at birth - the interaction that oc-
curs is one-sided. Developing the ability to act toward the self as an object depends on 
the development of language. Language is crucial in two ways: to provide the system of 
names for self and others that makes group participation possible, and to provide an ar-
ray of labels for objects. The child has a meaning to his I her parents which influences 
how they act toward him I her. These beliefs are based on a history of interaction with 
the child as well as cultural influences. The child also learns to role take, and can there-
fore become an object to itself. In order to do this, the child must therefore have some 
knowledge of the group of which it is a part. 
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The stages of the self develop as the child plays at roles once a basic vocabulary has 
been acquired. The child moves into the games stage - in which the organized game in-
volves taking the role of the generalised other. This gives the self unity. The acquisiton 
of the self is therefore sequential- each stage makes the next possible (Mead, 1934). 
Thus, three fundamental ideas concerning a symbolic interactionist perspective on per-
sonhood can be identified. The self has a dual location, that is, it is created by the in-
dividual as well as by others; following from this, the self is a situated object - in every 
situation the person sees himself as an object; finally, people can be divided into three 
aspects: location, images of each other, and evaluations of each other. Thus, the self is 
a complex and multiple object, and is the result of the process of internalization (Valsiner 
& VanDer Veer, 1988). 
This approach to the self also sees it as an internalised cognitive structure (as did the 
perspectives discussed in the previous section), developing out of interaction with the 
world, through the use of symbols. The next approach presented is radically different 
from those of the cognitive, individualist and symbolic interactionist viewpoints. 
2.2.3. Social Approaches 
The precedent for social theories can be found in traditional behaviourism, as charac-
terised and developed by Skinner (1953). Skinner's entire theory was built on an em-
phasis on external factors as the source of all actions. According to him, there are no 
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inner drives or motives. With the use of terms such as conditioning, stimulus, response, 
and reinforcers, he built a one-sided theory of the self that situated itself entirely in the ex-
ternal social world. 
Bandura's social learning theory took Skinner's theory one step further. He defined the 
self as "a ... system within the framework of social learning theory which comprises cog-
nitive structures and subfunctions for perceiving, evaluating and regulating behaviour, 
not a psychic structure that controls action" (Bandura, 1978, p376). According to him, 
cognitive and symbolic operations are representative of external events. Through the 
use of concepts such as modeling, he showed how the environment provides informa-
tion and controls reinforcement and incentive. 
One other theorist in this mode worth noting is Lewin (1968). Lewin maintained that 
there were no innate fixed traits. Behaviour was said to be entirely due to the environ-
ment. He phrased his ideas in terms of the phenomenological life space. Such a life 
space was said to directly affect all behaviour. This is essentially a construct depicting a 
field of social force. 
Research conducted on the self from such a viewpoint, has pointed to the value and 
validity of the effect of the social environment. For example, Mischel, Ebbeson and Zeiss 
(1976) found that expectancy, rather than experience, determined selective memory 
about the self. 
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2.2.4. Social Constructionism 
Since a type of social constructionist theory has been adopted as a frame of reference 
for the planning of this research, social constructionism will be discussed in greater detail 
than the previously mentioned approaches. 
2.2.4.1. An outline of social constructionist thought 
Social constructionism has arisen out of the criticism of those approaches which view 
the self as an empirical stabilized structure (Gergen, 1981). These approaches were dis-
cussed earlier in this chapter. Such views are subject to serious limitations. Accord-
ingly, it has become essential to give thorough consideration to those social processes 
in which the self is inextricably lodged. According to Gergen ( 1981) a recentring is 
necessary, that is, we need to move from a concern with cognitive processes to one of 
social exchange. Cognition does not essentially determine social activity as much as 
social activity determines what we believe to constitute cognitive processes. 
As one of the proponents of this approach, Gergen (1978, 1981, 1985, 1989) has out-
lined and described the social constructionist orientation in detail. It is principally con-
cerned with elucidating the processes by which people come to describe, explain or 
otherwise account for the world in which they live. In addition, it attempts to make clear 
common forms of understandings as they currently exist. Thus, social constructionism 
suggests a specific way of looking at reality (Semin, 1990). A basic assumption in social 
constructionist thought is that what we take to be the experience of the world does not in 
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itself dictate the terms by which the world is understood. Therefore, what we take to be 
knowledge of the world is not a product of induction, or of the building and testing of 
general hypotheses as would be suggested by cognitivists. 
Social constructionism developed out of the criticism of positivism. One is asked to 
suspend the belief that commonly accepted categories or understandings receive their 
warranty through observation. Research on, for example, gender, schizophrenia, 
suicide and childhood, has shown that the so-called "objective criteria" for each are in 
fact highly circumscribed by culture, history and social context. 
A further assumption proposes that the terms in which the world is understood are social 
artifacts, products of historically situated interchanges among people. Understandings 
(including language) within groups and societies are therefore the result of an active, 
co-operative enterprise of persons in relationships. These all undergo significant 
changes over time, and such changes are based on historically significant factors. 
Another point of departure for constructionist thought is that the degree to which a given 
form of understanding prevails on, or is sustained across time is not directly dependent 
on the empirical validity of the perspective in question. Rather, it depends on the vicis-
situdes of social processes. 
Such an approach also notes that forms of negotiated understanding are of critical sig-
nificance in social life, as they are integrally connected with many other activities in which 
people engage. 
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Social constructionism is based on the philosophical debate between exogenic and en-
dogenic theories: exogenic theories (e.g., Locke, 1952) propose that knowledge repre-
sents and informs us of the world, whereas endogenic theories (e.g., Spinoza, 1967) 
propose that knowledge depends on processes usually endemic to the organism. Thus, 
the new challenge is to rise above subject-object dualism; knowledge is not what is pos-
sessed but what individuals do. 
Social constructionism can be defined as social in that categories are received, not in-
vented, through tradition and symbols. The term constructionism refers to the assump-
tion that observers are in a sense free to constitute different realities (Shweder & Miller, 
1985). Thus social constructionism becomes possible through category formation. That 
is, individuals do things, they perceive, describe and explain behaviour, and this process 
of doing is influenced by received conceptualizations of the person in relationship to the 
moral-social order, and to the natural order. We conceptualize the way we do because 
that kind of conceptualization is presupposed by our social order and is requisite for its 
functioning. 
As a result, the self becomes a mastery of discourse - "knowing how" rather than 
"knowing that". It is only through grouping linguistic skills to make the world come to life, 
that full participation in social life can occur (Gergen, 1989). 
39 
2.2.4.2. The constructionist self: a sense of identity 
The social constructionist point of view can be taken to the conclusion that there is no 
self (Shotter, 1989; Shotter & Gergen, 1989). Our understanding and our experience of 
reality is constituted for us by the ways in which we must talk in our attempts to account 
for it. Thus, the only reason we talk about a self is because we need an inner cause of 
observable behaviour, and this need comes out of the individualistic and positivistic 
traditions. Shotter thus repudiates the traditonal Cartesian self as the ultimate source. 
The base is not the inner subjectivity of the individual, but rather, the practical social 
process between people. Our ways of talking become our reality. If our methods of talk-
ing are in any way constrained, then our understanding of ourselves will be constrained 
also. Communication is formative in that it is a process whereby people can form others. 
The activity between first and second persons is joint activity, and is important because it 
is intentional and shared. 
Shotter further notes that if we look at this process it appears that in the past 
psychologists have failed to make sense of society, or rather, study the sense-making 
procedures in our society. One of these failures has been outlined by Lakoff and 
johnson (1980). They have noted the metaphorical basis and nature of the terms we 
use, and in which we have formulated our accounts of ourselves. For example, we use 
visual and spatial metaphors such as "seeing" solutions, in the "back" of my mind, and so 
on. Thus, metaphor is pervasive in everyday life and in our conceptual system. In order 
therefore to fully understand persons in society we need to unfold the linguistic terms 
which persons use to define reality, and themselves in reality. 
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2.2.4.3. Conclusion 
The implications of the linguistic-constructionist position stand in direct contrast to the 
cognitivist position, in that language gets its meaning from the way in which it is used by 
different groups, not from the individual's cognitive process. The constructionist ap-
proach threatens traditional standards of scientific detachment and methodalogical 
rigour. However, further research in the constructionist mode is needed, as it has failed 
so far to render compelling accounts of the origins of discursive practices, and the 
relationships between language and behaviour (Semin & Gergen, 1990). 
One can contrast the social constructionist approach with the other approaches dis-
cussed in this chapter. The earlier versions deal with and outline a "trait" of identity. That 
is, the self (a "trait" of identity) is seen as an inner, stable cognitive disposition. However, 
social constructionism has moved away from this, to allow for the possibility of change in 
the self. Further, it allows for the self to be active. In this way, sense of identity is used 
as the descriptive term. By using the concept "sense of identity", one is allowed to con-
sider the possibility that the self can be reconstructed as cultural and social conditions 
change. Chapter four will elaborate further on this process of reconstruction. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
CULTURAL DIVERSITY IN SELF AND I OR SENSE OF IDENTITY 
3.1. TRADITIONAL WESTERN APPROACHES TO RESEARCH ON THE SELF 
There has been an overabundance of research into the self, and it has been correlated 
with just about everything, for example, creativity, therapy, and attitudes. The majority of 
this research has been conducted from an individualist and cognitive point of view, and 
thus cognitive processes are emphasized. 
Self-conception has received a great deal of attention (Epstein, 1973). This has genera-
ted the conclusion that beliefs about the self are organised into a self-theory, which filters 
and stores information, motivates behaviour and affects decisions. The self largely con-
sists of a person's explanations about his behaviour. Markus and Wurf (1987) have 
proposed a model of a dynamic self-concept, in which it is viewed as a collection of self-
representations. The set of representations that is activated depends on the context and 
is called the "working self-concept". 
Other research includes: characteristics of the "self" and the "other" (Rosenberg, 1988); 
the words employed in the experience of self (McGuire & McGuire, 1988); self-verification 
versus behavioural confirmation (Swann & Ely, 1984); self-perception (Sarason, Pierce, 
Shearin, Sarason & Waltz, 1991); motives and the self (Greenwald, 1980; Schlenker, 
1985); self-esteem (Tesser, 1988); the self and social anxiety (Pozo, Carver, Wellens & 
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Scheier, 1991); self-consistency (Backman, 1988); self-affirmation (Greenwald, 1980; 
Steele, 1988); self-complexity as a buffer against depression and stress (Linville, 1987); 
self-regulation (Scheier & Carver, 1988); the multidimensional aspects of the self- those 
aspects of the self that are salient at any given time which are elicited by situational cues 
(McGuire, McGuire, Child & Fujioka, 1978); and, the self in close relationships (Aron, 
Aron, Tudor & Nelson, 1991). 
Self-schemata have also received considerable attention. Kihlstrom, Cantor, Chew, Klein 
& Niedenthal (1988) have adopted the notion that the self is not a single cognitive struc-
ture; it consists of different concepts, each representing a different context or environ-
ment. Markus (1977) has defined self-schemata as attempts to organise, summarize or 
explain one's behaviour in a particular domain. Self-schemata are cognitive generaliza-
tions about the self, derived from past experiences, that organise and guide the process-
ing of information in social experience. In addition to schemata, the self as an organiser 
and evaluator of knowledge has been examined (Breckler, Pratkanis & McCann, 1991), 
as well as the self and social conduct (Brown & Smart, 1991). Research has also been 
conducted on determinants of selective memory about the self (Mischel, et. al., 1976) as 
well as individual differences in the self as a reference point (Srull & Gaelick, 1983). 
Much work has been conducted on the self and culture, which will be attended to later in 
this chapter. Some examples are: the self and play (Stone, 1989); the self and minority 
group membership (Spindler & Spindler, 1989); and, tests of distinction between the 
private and collective self (Trafimow, Triandis & Goto, 1991). 
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Finally, research has been generated into the developmental stages of the self (Damon & 
Hart, 1982), as well as the emergence of self-awareness (Kagan, 1991). L'Ecuyer (1981) 
has summarised the basic developmental stages, and found empirical support for each. 
The stages are: the emergence of self (0- 2 years), the assertion of the self (2- 5 years), 
the expansion of the self (5 - 12 years), the differentiation of the self (adolescence), the 
maturity of the self (20- 60 years), and the homogenous self (60- 100 years). Further, in 
accordance with the western emphasis on the adolescent crisis, the development of the 
self in adolescence has been the focus of a number of studies (e.g. Blasi & Milton, 1991). 
In conclusion, there is a distinct bias in the research on the self towards its cognitive and 
psychodynamic functions. This has however, been on the receiving end of extensive 
criticism. 
3.2. THE WESTERN CONCEPT OF SELF 
Before discussing the criticism of the western notion of the self, it will be helpful to ex-
pand on earlier assumptions made in the last chapter. Western conceptions of the self 
focus on the inner, private self - on emotions, states of consciousness, will, memories 
and the soul. The self is the agency of all action. We regard ourselves as being capable 
of acting on the world and exercising will-power, and we feel that we have the ability to al-
ter all our psychological attributes. A number of expressions illustrate this - self-
determinism, self-respect, and self-assurance. Control, by the individual, over all 
aspects of life becomes the focal point. There is a fundamental split between the self 
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and the object- which is an example of western fondness for Cartesian dualism. Main-
line psychology clings to this Allportian concept of psychological processes internal to 
the individual as the central focus. 
There is inherent faith in the separateness of distinct persons. The normative task is to 
become independent from others, and to discover and explore one's unique abilities. 
Others in a social situation are important, but only as standards of reflected appraisal, or 
as sources that could verify the inner self. The inner attributes of desire, preference, 
ability, etcetera, are insignificant in regulating behaviour. They are elaborated in memory 
-and are often known as core conceptions, or self-schema. 
According to johnson (1985) the western concept of the self is influenced by a 
monotheistic trend in western thought. Experience is either true or false; definitions are 
dichotomous and bipolar judgements are made. This leads to the imperative that an in-
dividual should be distanced from the environment, both social and physical. In that the 
individual succeeds in doing so, he becomes alienated and isolated. 
Psychoanalysis is perhaps the best example of a western construction of a concept of 
the self, with its extreme emphasis on inner processes and indiviualism. Yet, the univer-
sals that psychoanalysis claims to deal with have been frequently denied in other cul-
tures, for example India and japan (Roland, 1988). The claim that universals exist is 
another peculiarly western approach to the self. No systematic attempts have been 
made to prove these universals, and they are applied regardless to all societies. Any 
other way of thinking or doing is regarded as alien and wrong. 
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3.3. CRITICISM OF THE WESTERN NOTION OF THE SELF 
Recently, there has been extensive criticism of the individualistic western notion of the 
self (Gergen, 1973, 1981, 1985, 1989; Harre, 1981, 1983a; Harre, Clarke & De Carlo, 
1985; Harre & Secord, 1971; Sampson, 1977, 1978, 1981, 1983, 1985, 1986, 1988, 
1989a, 1989b; Shatter, 1984, 1989). 
Sampson ( 1978) has compared the two basic paradigms of the self which he describes 
as the naturalist (or individualist, western and modern self) and the historical (or inter-
dependent and post-modern self) conceptions. The former is seen as incomplete. For 
reasons noted in earlier sections, he considers the naturalist position to be ahistorical 
and acontextual. It developed in a context of Protestantism and has led to an abstract 
and general approach to understanding in accordance with the individualist approaches. 
Thus, this view maintains that order and coherence are achieved by means of seeking 
control and mastery over the world, through a personal system designed to achieve con-
trol. The contrasting idea is however, that order and coherence are achieved by means 
of seeking to fit into the ongoing scheme of things, through a person system designed to 
minimize self-other distinctions. 
The world is currently undergoing a major transformation from a modern industrial 
society to a post-modern and postindustrial society (Sampson, 1989a). On the whole, 
psychology's theories were developed during the era of modernism and were apt 
descriptions of the understandings of that time. However, our current view of the self is 
problematic for late twentieth century society. For example, in many societies over-
population is prevalent. This makes it imperative that a transcendence of self-other 
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boundaries becomes possible. A self such as the western self, which is designed to 
maintain the self as an individual "master" in contrast to "the other", is not suited to deal 
with an overcrowded society. Thus it will produce frustration, and will ultimately lead to 
self-destruction (Sampson, 1985). 
Investigation and research in six basic areas have challenged the western conception of 
the self (Sampson, 1983, 1989a, 1989b). In the first place, cross-cultural investigation 
has shown that the western concept of the self is extremely culture bound and unique to 
the west (Geertz, 1973; Heelas & Lock, 1981). Secondly, feminist reconceptualizations 
of the patriarchial version of social, historical and psychological life, have further chal-
lenged individualistic and positivistic notions (England & Kilbourne, 1990; Gilligan, 1982). 
Social constructionism has also presented a whole new way of looking at the self 
(Gergen & Davis, 1985; Harre, 1979). Three other approaches, namely systems theory 
(Bateson, 1972), critical theory (Adorno, 1974), and deconstructionism (Derrida, 1981), 
have in addition raised doubts about the utility of the western self. 
From these challenges we have learned that persons are socially constructed, as part of 
an ongoing process, and that they are not the root source of the social order and must 
therefore be viewed as ongoing creations of social living (Sampson, 1986). Psychology 
should therefore reconsider its goals and definitions. The functional unit which we need 
to understand is no longer the individual, but something more globalised (Sampson, 
1989a). 
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Sampson (1977) suggests that a reconsideration of goals can become possible through 
re-conceptualising our subject matter, by looking for dialectical processes and synthesis 
within systems,and not by de-inviduating the self. Thus, the type of self that should be-
come important is a form Identified as ensembled-individualism, in which fluid self and 
non-self boundaries should be encouraged to exist (Sampson, 1988). The task in a 
society therefore becomes to affirm and encourage ensembleism, in which people 
provide and receive assistance, without such an intersubjective situation to be seen as 
an infringement of their personal freedom. Ensembled-individualism might then maintain 
the individual within a socio-historic context, rather than alienating him from it (Sampson, 
1989a). Essentially, it is a combination of both individualistic and collectivistic senses of 
identity, and should be the goal towards which we strive. 
In a similar vein to Sampson, Manicas and Secord (1980) have also advocated a new 
heuristic, or philosophy of science for psychology. Subjective and objective approaches 
must be combined, by the realization that social structures are simultaneously the rela-
tively enduring product, but also the medium, of motivated human action. Thus " ... social 
structures (e.g. language) are reproduced and transformed by action, but they pre-exist 
for individuals. They enable persons to become persons and to act (meaningfully and 
intentionally), yet at the same time , they are 'coercive', limiting the ways which we can 
act" (Manicas & Secord, 1983, p.408). The most important result of a new approach to 
psychology is the concept of the person as we know and understand persons in our 
everyday lives (Harre & Secord, 1972). 
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Cushman (1990) verbalises such concerns by noting a shift in the content of the self, a 
shift that he believes has ultimately led to a current self that is empty. This self is per-
petuated by the modern state and economy, through its emphasis on individualism, 
materialism and consumerism. Such a process of individualising within materialistic and 
consumeristic goals, renders the individual vulnerable to emptiness and a life devoid of 
intrinsic and valid meaning. Ultimately, Cushman agrees with Sampson that the self has 
become a disappointment to itself. Thus we need to construct a society that counteracts 
the nihilism of our time, and psychology needs to contextualize an individual, in order to 
give more meaning to his life. Cushman (1991) has also noted that previous theories on 
the self have used ideology in order to obscure the control they in fact have. Those who 
describe and define the self in fact control our world, in that they are accorded the right 
to define, describe, understand and heal the self. They thus define, describe and control 
all social activity. From this perspective it is apparent that the idealization of the monadic 
self is in fact a battle for power and hegemony. We need therefore to get away from 
such viewpoints, and develop an alternative direction, such as the one suggested by so-
cial constructionism. 
Gergen (1973, 1978) has similarly pointed out that theories of self are essentially a reflec-
tion of contemporary history. Much of the current theory is in fact lacking in generative 
potency, that is, the ability to challenge prevailing assumptions and to offer new alterna-
tives. This is due to the influence of positivism and its reliance on verification and scien-
tific facts, and disregard for the temporal dependency of social patterns. 
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In a further criticism against the western notion of the self, Pepitone {1981) surveyed the 
metatheoretical areas in psychology and concluded that the individual is at the centre of 
most schools of thought. However, this individual bias is inadequate in explaining social 
behaviour. The dynamic and structural forces within the contexts of biology, physical 
ecology and the socio-economic environment play a substantial role. 
A specific example of criticism against western individualisation can be seen in Slugoski 
and Ginsberg's (1989) challenge of Erikson's theory and its central assumption of ego 
integration. They looked at identity conflicts in other societies and found that such con-
flicts do not correspond to our western view. Thus, Erikson's theory is class, race and 
sex bound. 
The impact of this criticism of the self has been to displace attention from the self as an 
entity, and to focus it on the methods of constructing the seJf(Potter & Wetherall, 1987). 
Language practices and discourses prevalent in different contexts are now the focus of 
study (Gergen, 1985; Harre, 1983a; Shotter, 1984). To look at how the self is con-
structed, one should research the grammatical matrix and everyday language used in 
discourse. There is a need to describe the content of representations of people in dif-
ferent contexts, and the range of self-images available in ordinary talk, as well as a need 
to ask how these images are used, and to what end. In other words, what do they 
achieve for the actor immediately, interpersonally, and in terms of wider social implica-
tions. 
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In this vein, Gumperz (1982) notes that in order to understand issues of identity, and how 
they affect and are affected by social, political and cultural division, we need to gain in-
sights into the communication processes by which they develop. Thus, the study of the 
function of language in everyday life becomes paramount. 
3.4. THE EVIDENCE FOR NON-WESTERN VIEWS OF THE SELF 
3.4.1. Introduction 
"The western conception of the person as a bounded, unique, more or less integrated 
motivational and cognitive universe, a dynamic centre of awareness, emotion, judge-
ment, and action organized into a distinctive whole and set contrastively against other 
such wholes and against a social and natural background is, however incorrigble it may 
seem to us, a rather peculiar idea within the context of the world's cultures" (Geertz, 
1973, p.48). 
These often quoted words form the basis for discussion in this section. It has been 
shown by various researchers that the western concept of self is not the same as the 
concept of self which many other cultures display (Berkowitz, 1988; Berry & Dasen 1974; 
Bond, 1988; Heelas & Lock, 1981; Marsella, De Vos & Hsu, 1985; Stigler, Shweder & 
Herdt, 1990; Triandis, 1988; Shweder & LeVine, 1984). In fact, it is now agreed that a 
western concept of self is not a universal; rather, self and culture have been shown to be 
interdependent. As White and Kirkpatrick (1985) have noted, personhood is based on 
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cultural foundations, and it is these foundations that need to be studied. Durkheim 
(1973) always put forward the view that the self is the product of social factors, and thus, 
because societies differ, different concepts of the self will be evident across cultures. 
D'Andrade (1990) has shown that all cognitive structures are culturally shaped and has 
found that cultural schema exist which serve as the definitional base for whole sets of 
terms. He concluded that cultural idea systems (e.g. morality) have a specific cultural 
context. Thus, one can never ignore or avoid culture when looking at the basis for per-
sonhood. 
Most of the research into "indigenous psychologies" (Heelas & Lock, 1981) has been 
done by anthropologists, because social psychology has until recently lacked both the 
language and the skills to study societies in such a way. Examination of different in-
digenous psychologies shows that there are wide variations in what counts as self 
(Heelas & Lock, 1981). Heelas (1981) has identified the dimensions according to which 
societies differ with regard to self-related isssues, as : internal versus external control, 
public versus private self, subjective versus objective, reason versus emotion, inner ver-
sus outer, and consciousness versus unconsciousness. 
Through the description of these various indigenous psychologies and folk theories of 
human conduct we become aware of the alternatives available for categorizing human 
experience and making sense of it. It thus becomes important to always use the ap-
propriate cultural contexts. Also, it is vital to recognise the limitations which academic 
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psychology in a western tradition has imposed on us, through the use of our cultural 
presuppositons. According to jahoda (1988), we are ignoring at our peril the immense 
richness and variety of social behaviours across the globe. 
Moscovici (1963) has given a good example of what happens when we let our cultural 
presuppositions cloud our judgements through neglect of an indigenous psychology. 
He makes use of attribution theory in his example: if two people attribute the cause of 
damage, one to the person (i.e., laziness) and the other to the situation (i.e., a crisis), it is 
not because they possess different information about the cause, but it is very likely that 
their conceptions of society will differ dramatically. 
Another important view in discussing how concepts of self vary, is to remember that the 
self changes over time as well. Thus, through history we can see that the self exhibited 
by serfs in Medieval Europe will be very different to that of European college students 
today. Theorists such as Mauss ( 1954) have noted that the western emphasis on self is 
in fact a relatively recent notion which originated with the rise of the modern state. In-
dividuals have come to be accorded value as separate beings, rather than as occupants 
of social roles. The present western notion of self is therefore frequently to be con-
trasted with both its historical precedents and other non-western cultures (Miller, 1988). 
Different cultures give different content orientations to the self and provide different 
meanings and emphases about the self. However, an issue that is of central concern is 
whether individuals, as a result of internalizing different systems of meaning, perceive, 
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conceptualize and feel the world differently (Fabrega, 1989). In the following sections it 
will become clear that different systems of meaning create selves that experience reality 
differently. 
3.4.2. Western Society Versus Non-Western Societies 
Miller (1988) has noted that cultures that have not conformed to the western view of 
identity are typically seen as holistic, sociocentric or collectivistic. She has summarised 
western society as being egalitarian, and valuing voluntarism and independence. In con-
trast, non-western societies are hierarchical, paternalistic and interdependent. However, 
it must be noted that this typology does not show the great variation that exists in the 
conceptions of the self. To divide society into two (western and other) is typical of our 
own western dualistic Cartesian nature. 
Along these dualistic lines, Anderson (1988) has divided society according to world 
views. Holding a western point of view are Europe, North America and minorities in 
these societies who have been highly aculturated. Societies holding a non-western view 
include American Indians, most South American countries, Asia, African countries and 
the Aboriginal tribes of Australia and New Zealand. Anderson has also identified the self 
I identity dimensions fundamental to such societies. He contrasts western with non-
western societies according to what they value: individual competition versus group co-
operation; individual achievement versus group achievement; a mastery of nature versus 
harmony with nature; rigid time schedules versus time being seen as relative; a limit on 
affect expression versus it being accepted; nuclear versus extended families; dualistic 
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versus holistic thinking; a separate religion versus one that permeates culture; a superior 
world view versus the acceptance of the world view of others; and, being task oriented 
versus being socially oriented. 
However, again, such a categorization is too broad, and does not allow for variation. 
Also, it reflects a very romantic notion of non-western cultures, a view which is frequently 
prevalent when comparing western society unfavourably with non-western societies. 
3.4.3. Concepts of Self in Other Cultures 
Previously it was identified that a very rigid and clear conception of the self exists in west-
ern tradition. Yet, as the following examples and research will show, this is a very alien 
view to a number, and in fact, the majority of other cultures and societies in the world. 
There are profound intrinsic interrelationships between the cultural conceptions of 
human nature, natural psychological make-up, and the nature of interpersonal relation-
ships in a given culture. These all impose upon construction of selves in such cultures. 
Further, this implies that varied concepts of self will exist across different cultures. 
3.4.3.1. The mind-body continuum 
One dimension in which some cultures differ from the western viewpoint of the self is 
along the mind-body continuum. The West differentiates between the body and the 
mind, yet, for example, the Gahuku-Gama of New Guinea regard the individual as a com-
plex physiological and psychic whole. The body is an integral part of the self, and in-
juries are inextricably bound up with damages to the personality (Read, 1955). Another 
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thought-provoking difference has been noted by Postal (1965). He draws an interesting 
contrast between the psychological significance of the body in Kwakiutl and Hopi cul-
tures. In the former, the body is a barrier protecting the indiviudal from sources of 
danger by ensuring that his public self is in order (e.g. state of dress). In the latter, 
danger originates with a loss of control, and a person's "bad Heart" takes over. 
3.4.3.2. Historical evidence 
Harre (1981) has cited historical evidence which shows that different concepts of the self 
and, therefore, indigenous psychologies exist. He believes that the best authorities of an 
era will present and reflect the typical view of the self in that time. Thus St. Thomas 
Aquinas wrote that reason is mostly in control, with some allowance for passion. Action 
should then be the result of decision and therefore freedom of choice exists. In contrast, 
Harre cites the Quadar tradition in Islam which states that there is only one path in life, 
and that is to act. The only freedom of choice one has is to choose how far down the 
path one is going to go. 
3.4.3.3. The indeoendent and the interdependent self 
Further evidence for a different concept of self comes from those societies who, in con-
trast to the western idea of an inner, all-controlling self, believe in an outer, all-controlling 
presence. For example, the Maori's traditional view is that man's identity is determined 
through inherited status and relationships with the group. Man's fate is ultimately in the 
hands of the gods. Identity or "mana" is fluid, and can be supernaturally given or taken. 
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There is no real conception of a controlling self, as experience in itself is not integral to a 
man- it happens to him, but is not of him. Thus a dissociation occurs between the self 
and experience to explain the fickleness of the world (Smith, 1981). 
A second example is that of the Dinka (Lienhardt, 1961). The Dinka appear to have no 
conceptions of "mind" at all- nothing to mediate and store up the experience of the self. 
They regard themselves as objects which are acted upon by the world. Yet, through 
their notion of "Powers" who control their world, they still exhibit some form of self-
consciousness. 
Many of the cultures studied show that their selves are social, that is, based in and con-
trolled by a social world. Howell (1981) has shown that the Chewong have a very limited 
psychological vocabulary, as well as a small range of body and facial expressions. As a 
result of this the question arose as to how the members of this society acknowledged 
and manifested their inner states and self. He found that they are subject to complex 
and numerous social rules which are all important, and therefore require close control -
thus leading to the suppression of emotions. As regards their concept of self, the 
Chewong do not regard themselves as essentially different from animals. Everything 
that lives has the same life-force. All mishaps are caused by superhumans. There is no 
distinction between the rational and irrational; the liver is regarded as the seat of both. 
Their rules explain inner states and are justified and operated by supernatural agencies. 
Only two exceptions to showing emotion are allowed: those of showing fear and shy-
ness, which are logical given their concept of self and society. The view that humans are 
vulnerable is embedded in their rules, and the rules thus serve a protective function. 
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The Lohorung Rai have a completely social orientation to themselves and to life 
(Hardman, 1981). They regard individual characteristics and a tendency towards 
egocentrism as being innate, thus sociability and the control of self have to be learned. 
From this arose their ideas concerning the nature of man, which focus on why a person 
should be sociable, how they can be social and how they can come to be in control of 
that which is individual. When individuality is not a threat to society, a person may act in 
widely diverse ways. 
Fajans (1985) studied the Baining and concluded that they see themselves in a technical 
sense: as embodied actors of roles. Their interactions are structured so as to validate 
this. Actors who cannot be so coded, experience disorder and deprivation. Further, 
they do not have a folk psychology and avoid any discourse about psychology. This 
very notion forces us to reconsider our own definitions of psychology. The Baining act 
as social people. Their descriptions of themselves depend on social roles, interpersonal 
interaction and the nature of social behaviour and action. Their life cycle is perceived in 
terms of the social and cultural views of food giving or taking, production and reproduc-
tion, and reciprocity. 
Markus (in print) has used the term "interdependent self" in describing Eastern cultures 
in general. There is a fundamental connectedness of human beings to one another. An 
individual sees himself as part of an encompassing social relation and recognises that 
his behaviour is contingent on what he perceives to be the thoughts, feelings, and ac-
tions of others in the relationship. The self becomes most meaningful and complete 
when it is cast in the appropriate social relationship. Such a self is not a bounded whole 
because it changes with different social relationships. 
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Another powerful concept of the self is that of the Hawains (Ito, 1985). It is graded in af-
fective social relations, which include humans, spirits and the natural world. It is a highly 
interpersonal concept of self, and is based on the reflexive relationship of self and other, 
and on the dynamic bonds of emotional exchange and reciprocity. Group harmony and 
an egalitarian spirit are stressed; affiliative bonds are important. A person is defined by 
the affective quality of interpersonal bonds. Thus, one gives generously of self in order 
to keep these bonds flowing with love, sincerity and warmth. By retaining self and dis-
playing jealousy, etcetera, goodwill is hurt and thus begins a cycle of negative exchange. 
One method of making things right is "ho'oponopono": this involves discussion, resolu-
tion, restitution, mutual apology and forgiveness. Thus the bonds between people are 
very important, and the establishment of interdependency is more central than personal 
autonomy and achievement. 
Social and linguistic evidence in studying societies has been used to prove different con-
cepts of self (Harre, 1981 ). For example, the Eskimos lack a strong sense of personal 
identity. There is no system in their language to indicate self-reference and self-
emphasis. Thus, "I hear him" would be "his making a sound with reference to me". So-
cially, individual feelings, intentions and reasonings play a minor role in regard to a large 
and varied catalogue of public performances. The social virtues of co-operation and 
peace are highly praised. They are thus collectively oriented. In a similar vein, but with a 
different emphasis, are those ideas fostered by the Maori. According to them everything 
(including inanimate objects) has potential energy, and an extreme form of individuation 
can therefore exist. However, a collective identity is also foremost and will only recede in 
importance in favour of individual identity, in cases where the collective will not be 
harmed. 
59 
Bharati (1985) has noted that the Hindu exhibit two concepts of self. The empirical self is 
interiorized as a state of being which is hierarchically lower than the self of the religious 
ultimate. All notions of mind are inferior material conceptions. The ultimate self totally 
removes one from society. 
The Chinese self is described as both the centre of relationship and a dynamic process 
of becoming or development (Tu Wei Ming & Chu, 1985). The self is thus a progressive 
continuity of ancestry. 
The Truk society has been compared with the west, where we value rational and 
abstract thinking and where knowledge is related through unifying symbolic constructs 
(Gladwin, 1974). The Trukese do not. They rely on the cumulative product of adding 
together bits of discrete data in predetermined parameters to arrive at a desired conclu-
sion. Thus, the western way is to begin with a plan, while the Trukese will do whatever is 
required - every move is determined on an ad hoc basis. 
Kirkpatrick (1985) has studied Marquesan notions of the self. People are said to differ 
from other beings in that they can adapt to a wide variety of situations in a social world. 
The Marquesans value co-operation and reciprocity, while also stressing self-sufficiency 
in providing for a domestic unit. Their notion of self is based on three main characteris-
tics. The first of these, concern, involves respect for others as goal oriented, and a 
recognition that the actor can draw on his own resources to help others. A further 
aspect is shame, a recognition that others may disapprove of one's state or activity. 
Also, envy is involved in self; the self can be expressed through envy - although 
someone is fundamentally the same as oneself, he may have gained an unfair or un-
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deserved advantage. These all depend on acts of recognition and relate actors to un-
derstandings of human competence; they involve action consequent to recognition. 
This action then changes a situation. 
3.4.3.4. Social rules 
Social rules as a function of every social relationship across all cultures have also been 
discussed (Argyle, Henderson, Bond, lizuka & Contarello, 1986). These rules are said to 
affect concepts of personhood as tied up in social interactions. For example, a basic 
study done in England was replicated in Italy, japan and Hong Kong. It was found that 
East-West differences existed. Both Eastern cultures endorsed rules underlying and 
reinforcing the collective (e.g., obedience). In contrast, the western groups emphasized 
individualistic values. 
Two further studies show similar results. Firstly, Cousins (1989) examined the influence 
of cultural meaning systems on the perception of self among Japanese and American 
students. He found that divergent cultural conceptions of the person impact on the per-
ception of the self, rather than differences in cognitive ability. 
Secondly, when the self-concept of Turkish and Dutch adolescents was compared, it 
was found that many differences existed (Verkuyten, 1990). For example, the identifica-
tion of social identity was far stronger in the Turkish adolescents than in the Dutch 
adolescents, who favoured psychological dispositions. Each group would have to 
present a self that is the most appropriate to their form of society. 
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Various studies have looked at patterns of socialization and the role that they play in 
determining the self. The East-West dichotomy has been expressed by Diaz-Guerrero 
(1985) in a comparison of patterns of socialization in India and Sweden. Indian atttitudes 
were easy to perceive, concrete and unanimous, whereas Swedish attitudes were 
abstract, vague and contradictory. Kumagai (1981) and Kumagai and Kumagai (1985) 
looked at bipolar attitudes of posturing in the Japanese, which are said to be a retention 
of the mode of interaction between mother and child. This allows for self-assertion, while 
complying with the socially desirable need for altruistic withdrawal. Bond and Cheung 
(1983) found that the type of self-evaluations found in Hong Kong, Japan, and the USA 
all serve a purpose in their particular cultures. For example, the Chinese were very 
modest in their self-evaluations- this would be important in maintaining group cohesive-
ness. Finally, Hoffman (1989, 1990) studied differences in the concept of self between 
Americans and Iranians living in America. She found that cultural differences and 
socialization patterns affected both cultural learning and adaptation to the USA. 
Cultural scripts or rules have been defined as further evidence for different concepts of 
the self (Triandis, Marin, Lizansky & Betancourt, 1984). For example, the Japanese 
script of amae, the black South African script of ubuntu, and the Hispanic script of sim-
patia. In studying the latter the researchers found that conformity and an ability to share 
feelings were viewed as of great importance among Hispanics. The needs for dignified 
behaviour and respect for others were also reflected. There is an avoidance of conflict, 
and harmony in interpersonal relationships is the goal. 
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Another example of how the self differs across cultures can be found in studying the 
development of identity. An example of this is the western identity crisis of the adoles-
cent as conceptualised by Erikson's theory (Whiting, 1990). Cross-cultural research has 
shown that an identity crisis is dependent on previous experience - especially during in-
fancy. It appears that two types of cultures exist: the first, the hip-and-back culture in-
volves close physical contact beteen the infant and the mother (e.g., the !Kung Bush-
men, African tribes, and tribes in tropical Asia). The second culture involves distancing 
the infant by placing him in a cot or crib (e.g., societies in Europe and North America). It 
is in these latter cultures where independence and autonomy are emphasized, that an 
adolescent crisis occurs. 
3.4.3.5. The individualist-collectivist debate 
Much of this work on the self can be summarized into the individualist-collectivist debate 
(Hui, 1988; Triandis, Bontempo & Villareal, 1988). Collective societies show a sharper 
differentiation of social behaviour; there are greater levels of association, subordination 
and intimacy within groups. These relations are more intense, interdependent and en-
during. Gudykunst (1988) has summarized the differences between individual and col-
lective societies, and noted that group membership is an important part of the self in cul-
tures that are low on masculinity. He also noted that social class and other hierarchical 
relationships are an important part of the self in collective cultures. 
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3.4.3.6. Conclusion 
From the above it can be seen that a wealth of international evidence has been gathered 
for proof that different concepts of self exist in different societies. These are based on 
different cultural and social rules, patterns of interaction and socialization. 
Much of this work on the evidence for differing concepts of the self comes from two dif-
ferent approaches - the cross-cultural approach (e.g. Berry and Dasen, 1974; Brislin, 
1990; Tedeschi, 1988) and the indigenous psychology approach (e.g. Heelas & Lock, 
1981). An example of the first is the individualist-collectivist debate (Triandis et. al., 
1988). Basically the major goal of cross-cultural psychology is to document concepts 
that compare cultures, as well as documenting concepts that are specific to cultures 
(Brislin, 1990). 
An indigenous psychology approach is different to the above in that it recognises the fact 
that psychological phenomena are both meaning and context dependent. The goal of 
this approach is to incorporate these factors into research (Kim, 1990). Indigenous 
psychologies are statements about the nature of the person and his relations with world -
cultural views, theories, conjectures, classifications, assumptions and metaphors 
(Heelas, 1981). By using such an approach, one enters into the very fabric of 
psychological reality, instead of using an ethnocentric approach just to compare groups. 
The aim is therefore to identify knowledge as understood and experienced by people 
within a culture (Kim, 1990). 
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3.5. THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONTEXT 
Unfortunately, very little research has been carried out in South Africa on the concept of 
self that exists in different cultural groups and how they differ, or are influenced by one 
another. It is taken for granted that white South Africans exhibit an individualistic self and 
that black South Africans exhibit a traditional, collective self. However, there is insuffi-
cient evidence to justify such a clear cut distinction. 
Urbanised black South Africans may exhibit a very different concept of self to that of their 
rural counterparts still living within a traditional environment. Afrikaans speaking South 
Africans living in isolated communities are highly likely to be far less individualistic than 
Afrikaners living in the cities. Thus there is a dire need to know how different cultures in-
fluence and interact with one another. 
According to Du Preez (1987) the concepts of identity and self in South Africa have been 
used to categorize and segregate, and have been further confounded with race. In addi-
tion the idea of a black concept of self has been used to reify black culture as organic 
and essential in comparison with the white western fragmented and alienated culture. As 
a result South Africans have been seen to live in separate worlds. However, identity is 
always changing and in South Africa this is doubly so because of social change (Harre, 
1979, 1983a). There is more interaction between cultures than there has ever been, and 
the question is to what extent this is affecting concepts of self or sense of identity. 
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Du Preez further notes that each system of identity has common signs, handed down 
through the generations. These become attributions and myths. Primal myths develop, 
around which a collective identity focuses. For example, black South Africans see them-
selves as exploited and exposed; the myth which confirms this would be the Sharpeville 
and june 16 Soweto riots. The myths for the Afrikaner would be the Great Trek, the 
Boer Wars and Blood River. Du Preez has also shown that in white South Africans, 
Afrikaner identity is much more articulated and defined than English identity. 
A review of the history of the self and identity in South Africa shows the majority of the 
work has been done by anthropologists (Kuper, 1988). Two trends, both of which em-
phasized differences between white and black cultures, and within black language 
groups, may be identified. In the liberal tradition (despite being "liberal") a heavy em-
phasis was put on differences between races, and in the Afrikaner tradition, cultural 
determinism was propagated and was used to underscore and provide support for 
apartheid. These two ideological trends provide separate discourses for the concep-
tualization of self and identity. Thus, ethnicity has been fostered and allowed to flourish 
in South Africa (Vail, 1989). 
Various authors have identified some of the key processes and dimensions of a tradi-
tional black concept of self. The most crucial feature is the holistic approach to life and 
the self (Holdstock, 1987; Kruger, 1974). Parrinder, when describing black psychology, 
says that "it is impossible to conceive of man existing in or by himself without a close 
relationship to the forces all around him" (Parrinder, 1969, p.123). The black South 
African does not traditionally distinguish himself from an object, animal, man or event. 
He does not analyze -and it becomes a part of him which he embraces with trust. The 
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relationship with the ancestors also encompasses all aspects of life. According to 
Mphahlele (1962) the social climate forms the basis for the self; interrelationships be-
tween people become more important and are valued above anything else. The broad 
elements of a black concept of self include the following - the functions of the extended 
family, the sense of communal responsibility, a tendency to gravitate towards people, 
and reverence for the ancestral spirits (Caldwell, Caldwell & Quiggin, 1989; Mphahlele, 
1964). 
Tutu (1981) has identified the concept of ubuntu (Nguni) or botho (Sotho) as underlying 
the self. This is the quality of being human and humane. It involves compassion, gentle-
ness, the use of strength on behalf of the weak, and the rule of not taking advantage of 
others. 
Thus, traditional black South African society was seen to be a person-centered society 
and noted for its interpersonal intimacy. The question now is to what extent concepts of 
self have changed as a result of urbanization, western influences and the forceful 
separation from traditional roots (Steyn & Rip, 1968). 
In looking at how concepts of self have changed, I will switch to using the term "sense of 
identity" to replace that of self. To reiterate, this term allows one to conceptualize of the 
self as an active and ongoing process, which can change and be restructured as society 
changes. Thus, it is a concept that is of particular relevance in South Africa. This will 
become clear in the next chapter. 
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One of the few studies that has briefly looked at the question of how senses of identity 
are changing, is the work by Munro (1986) in Zimbabwe. He studied work values and 
noted an interesting interaction between local and imported value systems. Traditional 
values were retained because they embody African identity in the face of a dominant 
minority group, and because they modify individualism. 
Further examples of studies on sense of identity include an analysis of self-concept and 
social class in South Africa (Bloom, 1960), and an examination of the personal con-
structs of modern and traditional Xhosa (Du Preez & Ward, 1970). However, this 
research is not recent, and there is a desperate need for generative work on sense of 
identity in South Africa. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
ROM HARRE'S THEORY OF SENSE OF IDENTITY 
To summarise the discussion presented in the previous two chapters, it is clear that 
traditional western notions of an inner, stable and cognitive self are considered to be in-
adequate. They do not allow for the variation that is experienced in other cultures. Most 
importantly, they ignore the possibility of change in sense of identity, or that one's sense 
of identity engages in an active and continual process of communication and construc-
tion with the social world in which one exists. Harrean type thinking however, corrects 
the deficit presented in traditional approaches to the self. 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
In view of the fact that many of the philosopher Rom Harre's concepts will form the basis 
of the research, this section will briefly discuss his approach to the self, its formation and 
maintenance, and its functioning in society, which he believes to be controlled by rules 
conducive to the moral order (Harre, 1979, 1983a). 
Harre has adopted an analytical and philosophical approach to the study of social 
psychological phenomena. Following the earlier traditions set by Austin (1962) he 
stresses the role of language in social action. He writes: "The study of social psychology 
and the attempt to understand the individual's relation to his social behaviour and social 
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theories has been transformed in recent years by a shift of attention, from mere be-
haviour to the genesis of action and the role of speech in the creation and maintenance 
of the social world" (Harre, 1976b, p.l). 
Harre's essential statement is that the mind has a social foundation. It is fundamentally a 
system of beliefs, structured by a cluster of grammatical models. Our minds are not the 
only things that are socially created: the acts that individuals perform and the interpreta-
tions made about the social and physical worlds are also drawn from social representa-
tions and collective action. Thus, a person is not a natural object - but rather a "cultural 
artifact" (Harre, 1983a, p.20). 
From this it can be seen that two primary realities exist in life: the array of persons and 
the network of their symbolic interactions. Thus, it follows that cognitive processes exist 
in the public collective I social realm, and are located in talk. Harre emphasizes that in 
order to understand people, they must be thought of as social productions. Personal 
beings are real, but are also the product of theoretical activity through the use of lan-
guage. In other words, through talk one acquires a socially acceptable theory about 
oneself, a theory that is socially constructed. The self, the intimate structure of an 
individual's being, has its source in socially sustained and collectively imposed clusters 
of theories. In addition, the self is a crucial construct in the formation of individual 
beings, and is relatively stable, although subject to change and responsive to long term 
situational changes (Harre, 1976b, 1985). 
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It is clear therefore that Harre uses the term self to depict some kind of stable structure 
embedded within a particular stable context. However, he allows for continuous action 
and thus change to this disposition, more readily than traditional western approaches. 
4.2. SELF AS THEORY 
In discussing the origins of personal being, Harre notes that to be self-conscious and 
self-active is insufficient to establish personal being (Harre, 1983). This is so because 
the structures of mind upon which this activity depends, and the form it takes, is derived 
from the social structures and linguistic practices of communities within which people, to 
become people, must live. Personal being arises only by a transformation of the social 
inheritance by individuals. It is essentially a semantic transformation and arises through 
the use of cognitive processes typified by metaphor to transform the social inheritance. 
This capacity is itself a social inheritance. Thus, personal beings develop out of social 
beings. 
Harre suggests that people create themselves and their patterns of interaction by virtue 
of the psychological and social theories to which they subscribe. The central construct-
ing concept of individual human psychology is a concept of "self", but it is a theoretical 
concept whose source is the socially defined and sustained concept of a "person" that is 
favoured in society and is embodied in the grammatical forms of public speech ap-
propriate to talk about persons. Our personal being is created by our coming to believe 
a theory of self based on our society's working conception of a person. 
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Harre distinguishes between four concepts which are used to identify individuals: per-
son, self, character and personality. Person is the socially defined, publicly visible 
human being, endowed with capacities and powers for public, meaningful action, 
whereas self is the personal unity a person takes himself to be, his singular being. The 
self functions in creating the unity of three things: personal identity, consciousness and 
agency. 
4.3. SELF AND SENSE OF IDENTITY 
Firstly, in creating a sense of personal identity the self operates by enabling the person 
to conceive of himself as a singular being with a continuous and unique history. Self-
consciousness must take on the form and structure of the grammatical forms in which 
personal knowledge is expressed. In English the personal pronouns take on this func-
tion by referring to a theoretical entity- the self- which is the centre of the field of con-
scious experience. Finally, the third component of personal being, agency, involves con-
ceiving of oneself as a being in possession of an ultimate power of decision and action. 
The theoretical entity at the heart of this is the same entity upon which our sense of per-
sonal identity depends. 
Personal identiy can be further broken into the fact of personal identity- what it is that 
makes a human being this or that particular person (in which body identity plays a role)-
and the sense of personal identity - how people experience their unique selfhood. To 
have a sense of personal identity, the individual should be self-conscious, as well as 
have some kind of experiential continuity. That is, present actions should be located in 
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an autobiography. The acquisiton of personal identity is based on social identity, which 
has two possible constituents, namely roles and being human. Personal identity has 
both social and psychological constituents, being physically distinct and distinct in 
character. The sense of personal identity depends on a socially enforced theory of self, 
by which a human being conceives a continuous co-ordination of point of view and point 
of action within the general spatia-temporal system of material beings, including other 
people. Thus it is a concept which depicts the possibility of change and the restructuring 
of a sense of identity. 
The conclusion that the above leads to is that identities can be socially made and con-
structed. This leads to Harre's idea of "identity projects" (Harre, 1983b). These occur 
when discrepancies develop between private beliefs and public representations, and be-
tween publicly displayed beliefs about oneself and private aspirations. Identity projects 
are then realised to remedy and resolve such discrepancies. A person's life themes and 
identity projects provide an ongoing framework and motivational source for everyday ac-
tions and life. 
4.4. ACCOUNTING FOR THE SELF IN SOCIETY 
The individual's ability to act or account for his actions depends on his stock of social 
knowledge (Harre, 1978). Further, this knowledge has a specific content and organiza-
tion which allows an individual to act adequately in social life. Harre emphasizes that this 
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knowledge is partly idiosyncratic, reflecting distinctive autobiographies, but it is also 
partly common, reflecting the social processes by which humans become persons (Von 
Cranach & Harre, 1982). 
Individual and social change is inherent in all societies, yet despite this, stability is often 
the desired norm (Harre, 1976b). Therefore, a compromise must exist in order to 
monitor social change and the adaptation of groups and individual processes in an effort 
to maintain control over the changing system. The individual's adaptation demands are 
primarily social in nature, and involve the inherent conflicts between the self and sig-
nificant others. These conflicts stem from competing needs for independence and de-
pendence, autonomy and mutuality, and self orientation and other orientation. Social 
adaptation further depends on three important aspects of self-orientation: self-esteem, 
social interest and self-centrality. They are all interactive, and a change in one will cycli-
cally affect all the others as well. 
4.5. MORAL ORDERS AND MORAL CAREERS 
Additional concepts developed by Harre include those of moral orders and moral 
careers (Harre, 1979; Harre, Clarke & De Carlo, 1985). Harre notes that a moral order 
exists, that is, an order which distinguishes between good and bad, and to which a 
person's character is accountable. Two types of order exist in a society. The practical 
order concerns socialization, structure and relations. The expressive order concerns the 
pursuit of honour and public proof of worth. Both orders are based in, but not ex-
hausted by, personal and individual competences and beliefs. The expressive order in-
74 
valves a transformation of something personal into something public (i.e., an 
expression). By doing this, other people form impressions of an individual as a result of 
their interpretations of his actions. Together, expressions and impressions form the ex-
pressive order. However, they do not always co-ordinate with one another. In other 
words, what is expressed and intended to give an impression, is not always the impres-
sion formed. Further, the expressive order does not always match the practical order. 
For example, in many societies economic power, generated by a personal position in the 
practical order, may not entitle an individual to public esteem (Harre, 1979). 
The expressive order is dominant in today's world, and is important in relation to a 
person's character. In the moral order, each individual will experience moral careers. A 
moral career consists of the stages of acquisiton of loss of honour and the respect due 
from other people as one passes through various systems of hazard characteristic of dif-
ferent social worlds. In a moral career one aims for respect by risking contempt. A 
moral career is managed by concealing failure and displaying success. A moral career 
also creates character - it creates in others the idea that a particular person has at-
tributes and aptitudes of a certain worth. Finally, at any given time, any single individual 
is passing through several moral careers in different places with respect to different 
people. 
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4.6. RULES OF THE MORAL ORDER AND THE SELF 
Thus, through the management of moral careers the self is adapted according to the 
needs of a situation. In order to exist successfully in the moral order, the individual is 
subject to rules. These rules are learned at an early age, and have many dimensions, 
some of which are justice, service I care, autonomy, obligations, rights and achieve-
ment. The rules are socially determined and are incorporated into the individual's moral 
careers. They are based on conventions and ritual, and enable an individual to look for 
respect, not contempt, from others in his social life. 
Two types of rules exist (Harre 1978). Firstly, there are rules of interpretation which are 
thought to be effective in the orderly ascription of meaning to objects and events. They 
are involved in the way things are defined and made sense of. Secondly, rules of 
prescription, which are directions for action: they allow people to choose between pos-
sible modes of conduct available to them and to maintain a sense of propriety and social 
legitimacy. These two types of rules are interdependent: rules of interpretation deter-
mine which prescriptive rules are applicable. Actions can then redetermine the rules of 
interpretation. Rules are referred to by social actors in justification of their actions, and 
thus an explanation of them can be systematically classified by reference to the kind of 
episode they generate. 
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A related concept to that of rules, is one of role. A role is that part of the act-action struc-
ture produced by the subset of rules followed by a particular category of individual 
(Harre & Secord, 1972). A person's roles are therefore the set of actions he is expected 
to take within the act-action structure of a certain kind of episode. A role is thus a nor-
mative concept, focusing on what is proper for the person to do within the rules. 
In conclusion, Harre believes that the primary human reality is persons in conversation. 
They are social atoms, although maintaining their mental organization as individuals. 
The self is a belief which endows the believer with certain powers of action in accordance 
with the interpersonal models available in society. Harre's approach represents a type of 
Kuhn ian paradigm shift. From this point of view, the presentation of self in a socially in-
telligable manner and the performance of ritual and practical action are linked. This is 
achieved through the general principle that persons are presented, and character 
created, in the style or manner of a performance. The understanding of the performance 
' 
is not necessarily something explicit, but appears in the choice of verbs in accounts of 
what happened, with the awareness of character showing itself in the choice of adverbs 
by which the description of the performance itself is qualified (Harre, 1976a). 
4. 7. A FRAMEWORK FOR THE RESEARCH 
Three types of sense of identity were identified in chapter three: individualism, collec-
tivism, and ensembled-individualism (Sampson, 1989a). In South Africa there are dif-
ferent cultural groups which are likely to be regulated by types such as these. Traditional 
black, rural communities, and isolated Afrikaner communities, probably exhibit a collec-
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tive moral order, whereas white urbanized English speakers might reflect an individualis-
tic western type of moral order. However, it is ensembled-individualism that is thought-
provoking and particularly relevent to South Africa. It is possible that as the two types of 
moral orders (individualist and collectivist) meet and communicate, and negotiate a new 
moral order, ensembled-individualism will develop as the sense of identity exhibited by 
persons. It retains aspects of both traditional senses of identity, and, yet simultaneously 
allows rules to develop which will ensure a society that does not intimidate any one of its 
groups. 
In Harrean terms, the aim of this study was to investigate the kind of moral order that ex-
ists in a sub-population of South African society - the school. The rules that govern the 
functioning of the moral order were examined. Further, from this, the aim was to identify 
the type of sense of identity that is constructed and maintained by the moral order and 
social rules. By using the term "sense of identity" instead of "self", one is able to make al-
lowance for the fact that sense of identity changes, and is continuously changing, when 
it is located in a moral order that itself is undergoing change. Finally, an analysis of dis-
course would reveal what type of sense of identity is exhibited (Harre, 1976b). 
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CHAPfER FIVE 
METHOD 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
A review of the literature has made it clear that attention has been displaced from regard-
ing the self as an entity, and is now focused instead on the self as a social construction 
(Potter & Wetherall, 1987). From this viewpoint the aim of research would be to elucidate 
the process by which people understand and account for the world in which they live. All 
understandings (including language) are the negotiated products of enterprise between 
persons. Further, the way individuals perceive, describe and explain their behaviour is 
influenced by received conceptualizations of the person in relationship to the moral I 
social order. We conceptualize the way we do because these conceptualizations are 
presupposed by society, in order to ensure its adequate functioning. Thus research 
should concentrate on elucidating the method by which the self is constructed. 
It therefore becomes apparent that language practices and discourses in different con-
texts have become the focus of interest (Gergen, 1985; Harre, 1983a; Harre & Secord, 
1972; Sampson, 1989b; Shotter, 1984). People are social productions, and the self bas 
its origins in socially sustained and collectively imposed clusters of theories. Thus, self 
theory is socially enforced and expressed in language (Gudykunst, 1988; Gumperz & 
Hymes, 1971; Potter, Stringer & Wetherall, 1984). 111n the last analysis, any socio-
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psychological image of the self, in fact the very possibility of a self-analysis is inextricably 
dependent on the linguistic practices used in everyday life to make sense of our own and 
others' actions" (Potter & Wetherell, 1987, p.95). 
Through looking at ways of speaking or telling, we can understand how an individual 
constructs himself and sees himself in terms of his social environment. Every individual 
conducts moral careers, which are determined by the moral order. Rules, in turn, ensure 
the safe conduct of these careers. Rules are used by actors to justify their behaviour. 
And, as Harre (1979, 1983a) notes, if we classify these rules in terms of the episodes 
they generate, we will be able to understand how a social context is constructed, and 
therefore, how an individual's sense of identity is shaped. From this, it is apparent that 
discourse analysis is an appropriate method to identify the sense of identity that is ex-
hibited, by means of an analysis of language. 
5.2 DISCOURSE ANALYSIS 
5.2.1. Introduction 
Harre (l983a) has noted that the very possibility of a self-concept or sense of identity is 
inextricably dependent on the linguistic processes used in everyday life to make sense of 
our own and other's actions. If this is so, traditional research methods are insufficient, 
and new methods should be developed to look at the self (Gergen, 1985; Harre, 1983a; 
Sampson, 1989a). Discourse analysis is one of the methods which has been proposed 
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as a solution, or a new approach to research (Mulkay, 1981; Parker, 1989; Potter & 
Wetherall, 1987). Potter and Wetherall (1987) and Tannen (1982) define discourse as all 
forms of spoken interaction, formal or informal, and written texts of all kinds. 
According to Gilbert and Mulkay (1984), the central feature distinguishing discourse 
analysis from previous research methods is that it treats participants' discourse as a 
topic instead of as a resource. The question asked is: "How are (scientists') accounts of 
action and belief socially generated?" (Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984, p.14). Discourse analysis 
focuses on how actors' accounts are organised to portray their actions and beliefs in 
contextually appropriate ways. They write: "It is the attempt to identify and describe 
regularities in the methods used by participants as they construct the discourse through 
which they establish the character of their actions and beliefs in the course of interaction" 
(Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984, p.14). Thus, discourse analysis fits in with Harre and Secord's 
{1972) view that the appropriate analysis of accounts will reveal the nature of the social 
competence responsible for generating both accounts and actions. It will further reveal 
how actors construct and construe the social rules within a moral order, rules which 
govern all social functioning. 
Language is central to all social activities, and is therefore easy to take for granted 
(Potter & Wetherall, 1987). It is a code for communication, involving abstract notions, 
actions, and events, removed in time and space, and it depends on people sharing a 
complex symbolic representational system. Language is inseparably involved with 
processes of thinking and reasoning. Essentially it is the most basic and pervasive form 
of interaction between people. Thus, language is used to construct and create social 
events. Social texts are a central and inescapable part of everyday life- they play a con-
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structive role in our social lives. Potter and Wetherall define social texts as "complete cul-
tural and psychological products, constructed in particular ways to make things happen" 
(Potter & Wetherall, 1987, p.3). They do not reflect or mirror objects. Rather, they ac-
tively construct a version of those things. 
From this, one can identify some of the basic components of discourse analysis (Potter 
& Wetherall, 1987). Firstly, language is used for a variety of functions and its use has a 
variety of consequences. In the second place, it is both constructed and constructive. A 
third component is that the same phenomenon can be described in a number of dif-
ferent ways, and hence, there will be great variation in accounts of events. We cannot 
deal with this variation or distinguish between "accurate" or "misguided" accounts. 
Finally, the constructive and flexible ways in which language is used should themselves 
become a topic of study. 
Thus, discourse analysis does not try to identify "true" accounts of an event, or reconcile 
one version (the analyst's) with the actors' divergent versions (Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984). 
The variation of accounts in itself is interesting. The linguistic content (what people say) 
is important, rather than how people say. Many researchers will try to solve the problem 
of variation in accounts by advocating observation of the event. But, if this is the solu-
tion, why try to get accounts in the first place? Also, observation depends on knowldege 
of shared social conventions. If no such knowledge is present, the same actions will 
generate different interpretations by different people (Harre, 1979; Gergen, 1985). Thus, 
the solution is not to resolve variation, but to make it a way into analysis. In other words, 
the question that should be asked, is, what is achieved by different accounts? 
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According to Harre (1979) we should be identifying the rules and conventions used by 
social actors to generate their behaviour, rather than looking for causes of behaviour. All 
actions must be explained by reference to the actor's "social competence", that is, the 
setting of limits on acts one can perform in social situations, and the determination of 
what will be accepted as the correct performance of those acts. Social competence is 
made up of knowledge of sets of social rules which enable people to act proficiently and 
rationally. People draw on regulative and interpretive rules to produce effective and 
legitimate social activity. Thus, in terms of discourse analysis one must "look at how a 
rule is expressed in a way that is appropriate to the speaker's context" (Potter & 
Wetherall, 1987, p.72). 
5.2.2. Method 
No definite method for discourse analysis, as compared with traditional research, can be 
identified. Rather, the researcher must have a broad theoretical framework, which will 
focus attention on the constructive and functional dimensions of discourse. The 
researcher must also constantly be aware of his own presuppositions and techniques of 
sense-making. 
Five broad stages can be identified: 
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5.2.2.1. Research questions 
The research questions will give priority to discourse. In other words, how discourse is 
constructed in relation to its function. Discourse and social texts are approached in their 
own right, and not as a secondary route to things "beyond" the text, for example, at-
titudes and cognitive processes. 
5.2.2.2. Sample selection 
As a result of the large amounts of transcripts involved, the sample should be fairly small. 
Also, small samples are usually adequate when looking at language use. Generally, 
however, there is no natural boundary line to be drawn, or point at which sampling can 
be said to be complete. It is simply a case of giving a clear and detailed description of 
the nature of the material one is analysing, and its origins. 
5.2.2.3. Coding 
Coding is distinct from analysis. Coding should be done as inclusively as possible, that 
is, incorporating all possible cases and instances. In this research the texts were coded 
as to the type of rules they reflected. These rules were either individualistic, ensembled-
individualistic, or collectivistic. Evidence of how this was done will be given in chapters 
six and seven (see also Appendixes A, Band C). 
5.2.2.4. Analysis 
Analysis consists of firstly, a search for patterns in the data. This includes both 
variability and consistency. Secondly, it involves a concern for function and conse-
quence. In other words, the discourse is analysed by understanding how it functions, 
and what the results or responses to this functioning were. 
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5.2.2.5. Validity 
Traditional positivistic concerns of external validity are not applicable to research con-
ducted in this manner (Potter & Wetherall, 1987). However, four dimensions of internal 
validity can be identified. Firstly, coherence- the analysis should give coherence to a 
body of discourse. That is, to understand how discursive structure produces effects and 
functions. Secondly, identification of the participants' orientation is crucial. One needs 
to identify what they see as consistent and different. A third criterion of validity is that 
new and further problems should be generated. Finally, the research should have value. 
That is, does it make sense, and are new explanations and new information generated 
by the results obtained. The concerns with internal validity will be discussed in chapter 
seven of this dissertation. 
Discourse analysis recognises that it is essentially reflexive, that is, the accounts of how 
language is constructed are also constructions. However, rather than getting caught up 
in an endless pattern of reflexivity, it is easier to recognise this as an issue, and to get on 
with the analysis. 
5.2.3. An Evaluation of Discourse Analysis 
Mulkay (1981) has stressed that discourse analysis is an alternative way for collecting 
data, and it has many advantages. It does not try to use observable evidence to explain 
unobservables, such as ideas. Secondly, inconsistencies in data which often appear in 
qualitative analyses, cease to be troublesome, because one is no longer concerned with 
what really happened. Finally, discourse analysis allows us to understand even our own 
academic literature, and place it in context. 
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Discourse analysis enables us to describe social problems, as they are manifested in 
forms of communication and interaction between people. We can identify the macro-
sociological patterns that exist in everyday life through an analysis of these forms of 
communication and interaction. In so doing, we will be able to then turn our attention to 
solving or preventing social problems. 
Discourse analysis has radical implications for our understanding and intepretation of 
findings (Potter & Wetherall, 1987). If we take a functional view of talk and writing, we 
cannot put that view aside when we deal with talk. We have to think about what people 
are doing in their responses, and what performative effects follow from this. 
Further, discourse analysis is a form of non-cognitive psychology. The researcher is 
asked to bracket off the issue of the quality of accounts as accurate or inaccurate 
descriptions of mental states. Rather, the focus is exclusively on discourse: how it is 
constructed, its functions, and the consequences which develop out of different discur-
sive organizations (Potter & Wetherall, 1987). 
Discourse analysis has mounted a critique of social science practice by challenging its 
functions, truth claims and methodological adequacy, and by importing concerns of 
moral-political accountability (Burman, 1991). It is extremely important to understand 
that whatever the theoretically motivated position, it is always part of discourse analysis, 
because one cannot escape from one's theoretical orientation. This is acknowledged in 
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this dissertation, and that a bias toward Harrean and Sampsonian type thinking exists on 
the part of the researcher. However, because this bias is acknowledged, it is taken into 
account in the analysis of the data. 
5.3. SAMPLE 
A number of schools were approached for participation in the research. These schools 
potentially, and on common sense foundations, had moral orders and rule systems 
which would reflect either an individualistic, collectivistic, or ensembled-individualism 
sense of identity. Four schools were finally selected to participate in the research. It was 
anticipated that working with the data would be extremely time-consuming, and thus the 
sample size was kept to minimum. Discourse analysts hold that it is not necessary to 
have a very large sample because the necessary information will be available from a few 
texts (Potter & Wetherall, 1987). 
The first school was a previously white (only integrated in 1991) school in northern 
Johannesburg (School A). The second school was part of a relatively isolated rural 
Afrikaans community in the Orange Free State (School B), and the third school was a 
farm school for children of black farm workers in an extremely isolated community on the 
Lesotho border (School C). Finally, the fourth school was a school in johannesburg 
which has been extensively integrated for a long period of time, and where the cur-
riculum and system emphasize communication and negotiation between different cul-
tural groups (School D). 
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From sociological and historical viewpoints, it is reasonable to assume that the pupils in 
School A would potentially exhibit an individualistic sense of identity. The school is part 
of a white and fully westernized urban community, where the emphasis is on western 
concepts of self, such as independence and autonomy. It was presumed that both 
Schools B and C exhibited a collective sense of identity. School B was part of an 
agrarian Afrikaans community. Traditionally, such communities usually experience col-
lectivism as their sense of identity. The pupils in School C were all black and from a rural 
and isolated community. It was therefore felt that as a traditional black sense of identity 
is collectivistic (Mphahlele, 1962), these pupils would be collectively oriented, as they 
have had little exposure to industrialization and the western world. Finally, School D was 
presumed to have ensembled-individualism as its sense of identity, since it represents a 
possible confrontation between individualistic and collectivistic cultures. Munro (1986) 
has shown that when two cultures meet, aspects of both are retained in a new moral or-
der. Thus, it was taken that this had been occuring in School D. 
Permission was obtained from the relevent authorities in all cases before the research 
was carried out. Participants from each school were randomly selected from a group of 
standard eight pupils, except in the case of the farm school, where there was no group-
ing of pupils according to standard, just a class of adolescents, from which the sample 
was drawn. The sample size of each group varied from 20 - 25. Variety occured be-
cause, for example, in School C the number of pupils present can vary greatly from day 
to day. Due to the nature of the research it was not important that every group was ex-
actly the same size, and in any case, the variation was very small. As a result of ran-
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domization, and because boys and girls were not always represented in equal numbers 
in the schools, it was not possible to control for gender. The selection of pupils from dif-
ferent cultural groups in the two integrated schools was not purposive, and also random. 
The ages in the sample varied from 12 years to 18 years (mean= 15 years). This varia-
tion was not felt to be of critical importance because of the nature of the school environ-
ment. The rule system in each school would be stable for all the subgroups, for example 
in School C all the children would be part of the same moral order and subject to the 
same rules. Further, the mean age of each of the four groups was in fact either 14 or 15 
years, a difference of only one year. 
5.4. PROCEDURE 
In a group session, lasting approximately one hour, each pupil was presented with a 
questionnaire. Basic demographic details were obtained from the respondents, for ex-
ample, age and home language. In each questionnaire, six scenarios were presented to 
the students. Each scenario dealt with a situation that was felt to be of intrinsic interest 
to adolescents - such as dating, friendships and parties - in order that the students 
would be able to respond to the questionnaires in a way that would not involve creating 
unknown responses to events that had not been experienced. 
The scenarios (which are set out in the next section) were drawn up by the researcher. 
Traditional research methods on the sense of identity were eschewed because they 
have a cognitive and western bias. Rather, it was felt that a creative procedure was 
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necessary, one to which the students could respond in a non-threatening way. This 
would allow them to express their social rules in a method suitable for discourse 
analysis. Three of the scenarios were constructed with an individualistic bias (that is, ac-
tions in which the actor indulged for his own gain), and three were collectively biased 
(that is, where the actor's actions were concerned with other's benefit and the common 
good). It was necessary to impinge some structure on the scenarios for analytic pur-
poses. Further, it was felt that this structure would also evoke definite reactions to the 
actions. 
Each pupil was asked, after reading the scenarios, to indicate whether he agreed with 
the actions in the scenarios, disagreed with them, or neither agree nor disagreed. He 
was then asked to explain his answer in a few sentences. This body of discourse formed 
the main data for analysis. The priniciple of discourse thinking is that one gains insight 
into rules by looking at how people justify their positions. 
Where necessary, the questionnaires were translated into Afrikaans and South Sotho (by 
the researcher and a professional translator, respectively). The latter was back-
translated (by a Southern Sotho speaking teacher), in order to ensure the correctness 
and validity of the initial translation. The responses in South Sotho were likewise trans-
lated into English and back-translated in order to ensure that information was not lost. 
The Afrikaans responses were analysed as they stood. 
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The questionnaires were administered by a teacher, after discussions with the 
researcher. This was done firstly, to avoid any effects the researcher's presence might 
have had, and secondly, to eliminate any language barriers and problems. It was em-
phasized to the students that the questionnaires were confidential, and that there were 
no right or wrong answers. 
Discourse analysts work with either written or tape-recorded discourse. In this instance 
a written format was preferred because it was difficult to obtain the correct recording 
equipment. Further, it was felt that the responses elicited by the students would not be 
as open if they were aware that they were being recorded. 
Where possible, two days were spent in each school (the only exception being School 
B). The first day was spent observing the students, the school system, and the interac-
tions taking place. Stubbs (1982) has recommended that researchers should engage in 
observation of action, as this would give them the benefit of some implicit understanding 
of what was happening. Finally, the second day at the school involved the administration 
of the questionnaire. 
5.4.1. The Pilot Study 
A pilot study was conducted on a group of six fifteen year olds from a school in 1 ohan-
nesburg, in order to ensure that the scenarios would elicit appropriate information that 
could be subject to analysis. It was found that they were valid in this regard, and that the 
participants' responses could be coded and analysed in such a way so as to 
demonstrate sense of identity. 
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5.4.2. Development of a System of Classification of Responses 
The responses were coded into one of three types (i.e., individualism, ensembled-
individualism or collectivism). This was done through the identification of rules that 
reflected one of the three. Thus, individualistic rules were those in which the individual 
was valued above all else. The individual's rights and needs would be expressed as 
retaining priority in interaction. In contrast, collectivistic rules would be those in which 
the good of the group was expressed as being of prime importance. In such rules, the 
individual would be seen to have importance in terms of his social group. All actions 
would be concerned only with the effect on the social environment. Finally, ensembled-
individualism was-identified by rules that combined facets of both individualism and col-
lectivism. In this way, for example, the individual would be seen as having rights, but the 
effects of this on the social environment would always be predetermined. 
5.5 THE SCENARIOS 
Harre and Secord ( 1972) suggest that the appropriate analysis of accounts will reveal to 
the researcher the nature of the social competence responsible for generating both ac-
counts and actions. Therefore, in this research, the pupils were asked to respond to dif-
ferent scenarios by stating whether or not they agreed, disagreed or neither agreed nor 
disagreed with the actions in the scenarios. They were then asked to account for, or 
justify their responses. 
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The scenarios favoured either an individualistic sense of identity and form of action 
(scenarios 1, 2 and 4), or a collectivistic sense of identity (scenarios 3, 5 and 6). The 
issues that the scenarios covered were activities that were culturally neutral and non-
political. For example, adolescent boy I girl relationships and friendships. How the 
pupils responded to them was then analysed. 
The scenarios were: 
Scenario 1 
Mark and john were best friends. john had been going out with Susan for six months. 
However, Susan was bored with the relationship, and broke up with john. She was very 
attracted to Mark, and started to flirt with him, despite the fact that this upset john, and 
caused a problem between john and Mark. Mark and Susan started seeing a lot of each 
other, and eventually became involved in a steady relationship. 
Scenario 2 
Eric was one of a group of Standard Eight pupils. He was ambitious, and wanted to do 
very well at school. He interrupted the class all the time by asking the teachers ques-
tions. Eric felt that this was justified because he wanted to make sure that he would Jearn 
all that he could from his teachers. Both the teachers and the rest of the class found this 
irritating. 
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Scenario 3 
jenny was going through a very difficult time with her family, and life in general. Nothing 
was going right for her. In fact, she was extremely depressed and unhappy, and wanted 
to commit suicide. She saw no point in living. She went to a party with all her friends, 
who were having a wonderful time. Despite desperately needing to talk to someone, she 
decided not to say anything so as not to spoil her friends' evening and fun. She felt she 
shouldn't even approach her best friend. jenny went and sat in a room on her own, and 
felt more miserable and desparate as the evening went on. 
Scenario 4 
Sharon and Peter were involved. However, their relationship was not working out. Peter 
treated Sharon very badly, but she put up with it because she loved him. Sharon became 
very miserable and unpleasant to be with. She was always unhappy and moaning about 
her relationship with Peter. She could talk about nothing else. None of her girl friends 
wanted to spend any time with her anymore. Her best friend became so tired of hearing 
about Sharon's problems all the time, that she told Sharon that she wanted nothing to do 
with her until she sorted herself out. 
Scenario 5 
Craig and Sara had just started going out. They had been invited to a large party, and all 
their friends were going to go. At the very last moment, Craig remembered that he could 
not go because of an earlier arrangement to spend the evening with visiting relatives. 
But, because he knew that Adam, Sara's previous boyfriend, who was still attracted to 
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Sara, would be at the party, he didn't want her to go without him. Sara was no longer in-
terested in Adam, and didn't think that Craig was right to worry about it, or to tell her what 
to do. But, she decided not to go, although she was really looking forward to the party. 
Scenario 6 
Carol and Debbie were best friends. Carol was very attractive, intelligent and played a 
lot of sport. She was popular and got a lot of attention, whereas Debbie was quiet and 
never really noticed. Carol was asked to take the lead role in the school play. She knew 
that Debbie desperately wanted to be in the play too, even in a small part, and so she 
asked the teacher in charge if Debbie could be given a role. The teacher said no. Carol 
then refused to take the role, despite the fact that she really wanted it, because she didn't 
want Debbie to feel bad. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
RESULTS 
6.1. SOCIAL AND DEMOGRAPHIC FEATURES OF THE SAMPLE RELEVANT TO THE 
RESULTS 
As discussed in the previous chapter, four sub-samples were drawn from four different 
cultural contexts. That is, School A was part of an urban, westernized society; School B 
was part of a small rural Afrikaans community; School C was part of an isolated black 
community; and, School D was a school that had been fully integrated for a number of 
years. From this, it was expected that the pupils in School A would express an in-
dividualistic sense of identity; the pupils in Schools B and C would be collectively 
oriented; and that the pupils in School D would demonstrate enembled-individualism as 
their sense of identity. 
Table 1 summarises the social characteristics of each school, as well as the expected 
sense of identity. 
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TABLE 1: SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS 
SCHOOL SOCIAL SETTING RACIALLY INTEGRATED EXPECTED SENSE 
A 
B 
c 
D 
I SEPARATE OF IDENTITY 
Johannesburg, recently individualism 
urban, integrated 
westernized 
stable, rural separate collectivism 
agrarian, 
Afrikaans 
isolated, 
rural, 
separate collectivism 
farm school 
Johannesburg, integrated ensembled-
communication individualism 
and negotiation 
between groups 
encouraged, 
fluid and open 
The total sample size was 91, with an age range of 12 - 18 years {mean age = 15). 
Thirty eight of the participants were male and 53 were female. This discrepancy in the 
sex ratios was unavoidable because of random sampling, and further, in schools B and 
C, female pupils were in the majority. The demographic characteristics of the individual 
schools are outlined in Table 2, and described below: 
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In School A the sample consisted of 25 pupils, ranging in age from 14 - 17 years (mean 
age = 15). 40% of the pupils were male and 60% were female. The home language of 
the pupils was identified as follows: 72% English, 12% Sotho, 8% Zulu, 4% Ndebele, and 
4% Hebrew. 32% of the sample had been at the school for less than 2 years. 
In School B the sample size was 20, with an age range of 13- 16 years (mean age= 14). 
The majority of the pupils- 65%- were female, and 35% were male. All spoke Afrikaans 
as their home language. 10% of the pupils had been at the school for less than 2 years. 
The number of pupils tested in School C was 21, with an age range of 12 - 18 years 
(mean age= 15). Of these pupils, 72% were female and 28% were male. All the pupils 
spoke SeSotho as their home language. 14% of the sample had been at the school for 
less than 2 years. 
Finally, in School D the sample size was 25, with an age range of 15 - 16 years (mean 
age= 15). 60% of the pupils were male, and 40% were female. The home language of 
the pupils can be broken down as follows: 60% English, 8% Zulu, 8% Tswana, 8% Sotho, 
4% Afrikaans, 4% Mandarin, 4% Xhosa, and 4% Tsonga. 8% of the participants had 
been at the school for less than 2 years. 
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TABLE 2: DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SAMPLE 
SCHOOL n SEX MEAN AGE HOME LANGUAGE 
School A 25 male • 10 15 English • 18 
female • 15 Sotho • 3 
Zulu • 2 
Ndebele • 1 
Hebrew • 1 
~chool B 20 male • 7 14 Afrikaans • 20 
female • 13 
~chool C 21 male • 6 15 SeSotho • 21 
female • 15 
~chool D 25 male • 15 15 English • 15 
female • 10 Zulu • 2 
Tswana • 2 
Sotho • 2 
Mandarin • 1 
Afrikaans • 1 
Tsonga • 1 
Xhosa • 1 
n • 91 
6.2. RESULTS OF DISCOURSE ANALYSIS 
Due to the method used to analyse the data (discourse analysis), there will be no statis-
tics presented on the results. Rather, the discussion of the results in the next chapter will 
elucidate and focus more closely· on the data and information obtained from the written 
texts. However, some detail and the initial results of the coding of the data will be 
presented in this chapter. 
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6.2.1. The Discursive Task 
Each participant was asked to indicate whether he I she agreed, did not agree, or 
neither agreed nor disagreed with the actions in the scenario. Their responses were 
thus roughly coded as reflecting either an individualistic or collectivistic sense of identity. 
Then, the reasons given by the pupils for their responses were approached in the 
method of discourse analysis. They were coded and analysed as to the form of sense of 
identity reflected in each case. This was done through an analysis and understanding of 
the type of rules outlined and reflected by the participants in their explanations of their 
responses. Once this was completed, each response was coded as being either in-
dividualistic, ensembled-individualism, or collectivistic (see Appendix B). 
6.2.2. Coding 
According to discourse analyists, coding has a pragmatic rather than an analytic goal. 
Thus the idea is to collect all instances which are applicable for analysis. Coding is 
therefore as inclusive as possible. All phrases, sentences, adverbs, and so on, that were 
applicable in demonstrating one of the three senses of identity, were noted on a 
separate coding sheet (see Appendix C for an example of the full coding process). 
In this way, a sentence such as "I don't think that Susan should be worried about the 
other friendship" would be coded as displaying an individualistic sense of identity. 
Similarly, a phrase such as "sy moet haar medemens Jiefhe" would be coded as indicat-
ing a collectivistic sense of identity. Further, a sentence such as "she should have told 
her previous boyfriend that she was leaving him and not just dropped him" was coded as 
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reflecting ensembled-individualism as a sense of identity. This was so because the pupil 
was explaining that one should always justify and explain one's actions to others, in or-
der to avoid hurting anybody. (Additional details on the classification of discourse follow 
later.) 
6.2.3. Analysis 
The actual analysis of the data involves looking at the detail not just the gist of the text. 
There is no clear analytic method for discourse analysis. Rather, the coded data is ap-
proached using a broad theoretical framework, which will focus on the constructive and 
behavioural dimensions of the data. Two phases are involved in analysis. Firstly, one 
looks for patterns (both variability and consistency) in the data. Secondly, one looks at 
the functions and consequences of the discourse. 
Thus, the data which had been coded, was finally analysed as being either individualistic, 
enembled-individualistic, or collectivistic in orientation. Within each pupil's responses, 
consistencies were looked for. For example, pupils who consistently demonstrated in-
dividualistic values were coded as displaying individualism as their sense of identity. 
Variability within the responses of one pupil's questionnaire was also analysed. This 
took the form of identifying whether or not the variability indicated and supported a par-
ticular type of sense of identity. One inconsistency within each of the pupil's responses 
was tolerated. For example, scenarios 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 could have reflected individualistic 
values, whereas scenario 6 may have reflected collectivistic values. The pupil would 
finally be coded as displaying an individualistic sense of identity. However, if two or 
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more inconsistencies were apparent the data was re-analysed and possibly reclassified. 
Thereafter, patterns and inconsistencies within each sub-sample as a whole were iden-
tified. 
6.3. THE RESPONSES TO THE SCENARIOS 
In order to clarify what type of phrases or sentences were classified as reflecting one of 
the three types of sense of identity, this section will briefly give examples of each. Chap-
ter seven however, presents a detailed discussion of the responses to the scenarios (see 
Appendixes A and C). 
Responses were coded as suggested in 6.2.2. This involved a breaking down of one full 
response by a subject into sub units, and identifying the relevant rules. These rules were 
selected in terms of the general theme of the research and in terms of the researcher's 
understanding. One full example of the rules present in a particular school is given 
below: 
Rules Identified in Scenario One by Pupils in School D: 
1. In scenario l similar rules used by the pupils were: 
i. every person has a right to do exactly what he I she wants to do 
ii. one does not have to worry about the consequences of one's actions for other 
people 
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2. However, some of the rules expressed the type of principles detailed below: 
i. friendship is more important than relationships 
ii. one must always think of the effect that one's actions could have on others 
iii. one's own needs come last 
3. Finally, a third form of rule was also identified: 
i. one should consider one's actions carefully, but not deny oneself 
ii. one should always look at both sides of the story 
iii. one should always explain I justify one's behaviour 
In terms of the analysis presented above, the following types of responses were found. 
They seemed to be classifiable according to the main theory of the research. Examples 
follow. 
Responses reflecting a cultural system of individualism: 
Scenario 1: "if she was bored she feel obliged to break-up" 
Scenario 2: "he had the right to gain more knowledge ... the rest of the class could 
only ... learn more from his questions" 
Scenario 3: "if she needed to talk to someone she should have" 
Scenario 4: "(one) doesn't have to put up with others' problems" 
Scenario 5: "she can do what she wanted to do" 
Scenario 6: "you cannot be responsible for other people's actions and if you are 
going to better yourself without deliberately hurting someone - so be it" 
From this it is clear that the individual and his rights are favoured above other people. 
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Responses reflecting a cultural rule system of collectivism: 
In contrast, however, the following examples of collectivistic responses show that the in-
dividual is seen as having a role in terms of the importance of the group, and in relation-
ships with other people. His own rights have the least priority. 
Scenario 1: "/think it was wrong for Susan ... because Mark is John's best friend, and 
best friends always hang out together and talk about their problems" 
Scenario 2: "dit is slegte maniere. Dit sal ook jou houding wys teenoor jou ouers en 
grater mense as jy" 
Scenario 3: "one should not disrupt others' enjoyment" 
Scenario 4: "sy moet haar medemens liefhe en na bulle probleme luister" 
Scenario 5: 'sy sou dalk baie seer gekry het om net met een te gaan en nie met die 
ander nie" 
Scenario 6: "niemand het toe seergekry nie" 
Responses reflecting a cultural rule system of ensembled-individualism: 
The most thought-provoking responses were those that combined indvidualistic and col-
lectivistic ideas. In these responses, the indivdiual was seen as important, but, the group 
should not be harmed in any way. Further, open communication and explanation of 
one's behaviour was always emphasized. Finally, both viewpoints are always identified, 
in contrast to the other two senses of identity, where only one (either individualism or col-
lectivism) was identified. The following examples of discourse demonstrate these points. 
Scenario 1: "she should have told her previous boyfriend she was leaving him and 
not just dropped him" 
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Scenario 2: "it is neither right nor wrong ... he wanted to know as much as possible but 
it was wrong to interrupt every time" 
Scenario 3: "best friends should normally share their feelings ... but she was very 
thoughtful not to interrupt" 
Scenario 4: "by her best friend telling her this, she will have her quickly awakened" 
Scenario 5: "both of them missed the point ... they should have trusted each other" 
Scenario 6: "Carol was a true friend ... but on the other hand Debbie could have been 
more supportive" 
Finally, the pupils' home languages were noted, as their social background should affect 
the sense of identity displayed. Further, it was noted how long pupils had been at the 
school in question, because newer pupils were less likely to identify with the moral order 
present in a school, especially in the recently integrated school. 
The results obtained from the initial phase are presented in Table 3: 
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TABLE 3: RESULTS 
~CHOOL INDIVIDUALISTIC ENSEMBLED- COLLECTIVISTIC 
INDIVIDUALISM 
A 14 7 4 
n • 25 
B 5 3 12 
n• 20 
c 5 16 0 
n • 21 
D 7 15 3 
n • 25 
6.4. A Further Clarification of the Type of Rule Systems Predominant in the Schools 
6.4.1. School A 
In School A, 56% of the pupils in the sample were coded as exhibiting an individualistic 
sense of identity, 28% were seen to reflect ensembled-individualism, and 16% were col-
lectively oriented. A breakdown of these figures showed that out of the individualistic 
pupils, English was the first language for 13, and Sotho the first language for 1 of these 
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pupils. Among those pupils who reflected ensembled-individualism as their sense of 
identity, 4 were English speakers, and 1 each were either Sotho, Ndebele or Hebrew 
speaking. None of the pupils who exhibited a collectivistic sense of identity spoke 
English as their first language. Two were Zulu speakers, 1 was Sotho speaking and 1 
was Hindu speaking. Half of the pupils who had been at the school for less than 2 years 
exhibited a collective sense of identity, and none of these pupils were from English 
speaking homes. 
6.4.2. School B 
In School B, 25% of the pupils reflected an individualistic sense of identity, 15% were 
ensembled-individualists, and 60% were collectively oriented. All the pupils spoke 
Afrikaans as their first language. The 2 pupils who had been at the school for less 
than two years both showed a collective sense of identity. 
6.4.3. School C 
In School C, 24% of the pupils exhibited an individualistic sense of identity, 76% were 
classified as being ensembled-individualists, and none were collectively oriented. All the 
pupils spoke SeSotho as their first language. The 3 pupils who had been at the school 
for less than 2 years all exhibited ensembled-individualism as their sense of identity. 
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6.4.4. School D 
In School D, 28% of the pupils demonstrated an individualistic sense of identity, 64% ap-
peared to be ensembled-individualists, and 8% exhibited a collective sense of identity. 
Out of the pupils who were individualistically oriented, 5 were English speakers, 1 was 
Sotho speaking, and 1 was Xhosa speaking. Of the ensembled-individualists, 10 were 
English speaking, 2 were Zulu speakers, 2 were Tswana speakers, 1 was a Mandarin 
speaker, and 1 spoke Afrikaans as her home language. The 2 pupils who were clas-
sified as having a collective sense of identity, spoke either Sotho or Tsonga at home. 
One of these pupils had been at the school for less than 2 years. An additional pupil who 
had also been at the school for a limited period of time, reflected ensembled-
individualism as his sense of identity. 
Finally, Table 4 presents the percentages of individualistic, ensembled-individualism and 
collectivistic responses received for the scenarios in each school. As can be seen, 
School A was predominantly individualistically oriented, with the exception of scenario 4. 
School B was predominantly collective, except in scenarios 2 and 3. The third school 
(C) revealed a predominantly ensembled-individualistic sense of identity, except in 
scenario 4. Finally, School D also revealed a predominantly ensembled-individualistic 
sense of identity, with the exceptions of scenarios 2 and 6. Some of the participants did 
not always respond to all the scenarios, and these were then coded as unclassified. Fur-
ther, on occasion the responses were nonsensical, and these again, were coded as un-
classified. 
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TABLE 4: PERCENTAGE OF RESPONSES RECEIVED 
IN EACH CATEGORY 
~CHOOL INDIVIDUALISM EN SEMBLED- COLLECTIVISM 
INDIVIDUALISM 
A 
~cenario 1 36 32 32 
2 64 20 16 
3 44 40 16 
4 24 28 48 
5 64 8 28 
6 48 20 32 
B 
~cenario 1 20 15 60 1 unclassifiec 
2 50 20 20 2 unclassifiec 
3 45 50 5 
4 10 25 65 
5 25 10 60 1 unclassified 
6 15 15 65 1 unclassified 
c 
scenario 1 14 67 19 
2 33 67 0 
3 33 67 0 
4 0 48 52 
5 38 57 5 
6 33 57 5 1 unclassified 
D 
scenario 1 40 28 32 
2 56 40 4 
3 20 68 12 
4 36 48 16 
5 28 36 36 
6 36 32 32 
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The next chapter will involve a more detailed discussion of the responses, and why they 
reflected certain types of sense of identity. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
7 .1. THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY 
According to Harre (1979, 1983) the aim of analysis is to identify the rules and conven-
tions used by social actors, rather than the causes of their behaviour. These rules 
enable an individual to exist successfully within a particular moral order, and to carry out 
his I her moral careers. Further, they allow the person to look for respect from others, 
and to exist in a valid manner. 
As was explained fully in earlier chapters, people are seen to be essentially social 
productions, and the source of a sense of identity is a socially defined and sustained 
concept of person that is favoured in a society, and through a society's rules. As a 
result, reality becomes a social construction. Therefore, this study looked at the sense 
of identity that was exhibited by individuals in different school contexts in order to gain an 
understanding of aspects of present day South African society. The results of the 
analyses are discussed below. 
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7 .2. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DISCOURSE 
7 .2.1. School A 
As explained in chapter five, School A was chosen because it is situated in northern 
Johannesburg, an area displaying a typically western individualistic social environment 
and reality. The school had only recently- 1990- been integrated. The rules show that a 
completely individualistic sense of identity was not present, although the majority of the 
children displayed individualistic values. Most interestingly, those pupils who displayed a 
collective sense of identity had all been at the school for a short period of time. Addition-
ally, English was not the home language for any of them. They spoke either Sotho, Zulu 
or Hindu. These three languages all reflect cultures that are traditionally collective in 
orientation, and it is important to note how this collectivism is being maintained in the 
face of a predominantly individualistic moral order. Munro (1986) noted a similar 
development in Zimbabwe, and concluded that this is due to individuals trying to retain 
some semblance of identity in the face of an alien and dominant moral order. Addition-
ally, the influence of home background appears to have some effect as well. Home in-
fluences have in fact been shown to hinder the effectiveness of ethnic mixing in Nigeria 
(Ogunlade, 1972). 
However, the fact that almost a third of the children were beginning to exhibit 
ensembled-individualism as their sense of identity has important implications. More than 
half of these children speak English as their home language, and yet, obviously the ef-
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fects of integration are being felt, as pupils from different traditional social backgrounds 
begin to negotiate a new moral order with new rules. Individualistic and collectivistc 
senses of identity are palpably merging, with ensembled-individualism resulting. 
Various rules can be identified which control the moral order. The most relevant rule in 
terms of the individualistic sense of identity expressed, is that the individual or person 
comes first in all things. He has a right to do exactly what he wants, and to be in control 
of his life. Independence and individual responsibility are seen as crucial. There is no 
room for responsibility for others. 
As far as scenario l was concerned, it was felt that it was the girl's right to do exactly 
what she wanted, and what was good for her. The following sentences sum this up: 
''Susan is an individual", and "I think Susan was right to do what is best for her and to do it 
for her own sake". Self-improvement, for one's own sake is identified as important, and 
in scenario 2 pupils who critisized the one pupil for asking questions, were negatively 
seen as self-conscious, and were often derogated. 
Individuals are seen as having a right to demand attention (scenario 3), for example, ''you 
have to speak", and one has a right "to express how she feels and what her needs, wants 
and desires are". But, on the other hand, this individualistic pattern is taken to the ex-
treme by the responses received to scenario 4, where the rule is that one "doesn't have 
to put up with others' problems". In other words, one has a right to demand attention if it 
is one who needs attention, but if it is someone else, one has the right to ignore this, as it 
would involve an impingement on one's territory and time. All the above were reflected 
in the fifth scenario, which elicited strong responses favouring a rule of individualism. 
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Generally, it was felt that individuals are independent, and that no one has the right to tell 
them what to do. This was reflected by phrases such as "(Sara) had every right!' and 
"everbody wants to be independent". An additional rule that came to the fore, was that all 
individuals should be trusted: "if Craig couldn't trust Sara then it isn't worth being 
involved". People who don't give individuals the right to be trusted were seen as 
"childish". 
Finally, the theme of individualism was carried through into the last scenario where it was 
seen as crucial that a person doesn't ruin his chances because of fear of hurting 
someone else. If someone has abilities or talents, it is vital that they develop these 
abilities- nothing should stand in one's way. This is clearly expressed in the phrase "she 
should have taken the role"- with the emphasis on the word "taken" which underlines the 
individual's right to do what is good for him. Once again, the feeling that one is respon-
sible for oneself, and not for others, was expressed, for example: "I find that she did a 
very kind act, but you cannot put yourself down and not succeed in things just because 
other people will get offended". 
Those pupils who reflected ensembled-individualism as their sense of identity, were 
clearly lying in the middle of the consideration-inconsideration continuum. They con-
sidered their rights to exist in terms of others as well. One's own needs cannot be 
neglected, but, the results of one's actions for other people must always be taken into 
consideration. Thus, one pupil critisized the actions in scenario 1: ''she should have con-
sidered the fact that there would be mixed emotions between Mark and john, but she 
obviously couldn't be bothered". Yet, on the other hand, in scenario 6, the following was 
expressed: ''you can't always do things to make sure that somebody else doesn't get 
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hurt". There was a strong feeling that other people should always be seen as meaningful 
and relevent in terms of one's actions, for example, in scenario 4 one pupil responded 
negatively to the actions because the person in the scenario "was meaningless to them". 
The most important rule that was expressed, was that of communication, mutual deci-
sions and mutual respect: "a relationship should be based on mutual trust and not fear". 
Thus these pupils felt it important to understand all points of view before making a deci-
sion, not necessarily in one's favour. 
In contrast, the pupils who expressed collectivism as their sense of identity, always put 
their own needs last, behind those of the group and other people. A general rule was 
that one should never hurt or use other people, or break up a friendship. For example, 
in scenario 1, the girl's actions were seen as absolutely wrong: ''Susan had no right to 
get involved with Mark", ''you never go out to hurt somebody", and "it's not right ... she 
broke the relationship betwen Mark and john". Similarly, in scenario 2, the boy was seen 
as ''selfish" for putting his own academic needs above those of the class. Identity was 
also seen in terms of the group, as for example, in scenario 3, to disturb the group would 
have meant them being angry with one, and left them with negative perceptions about 
one. The aim (in Harrean terms) is to always command respect and honour from others. 
Again, (as in the individualistic responses) scenario 4 took this to the extreme in that one 
is never allowed to "desert" a friend or be "self-centered". As one pupil put it: "How can a 
friend do that?" Friendships were seen as especially important, and in terms of love 
relationships, one was seen as part of a couple, not as an individual. One pupil 
remarked: "What was the point of her going?" if she had to go alone. One was asked to 
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''make sacrifices" in order to build relationships and to consider other people first. This 
was echoed in scenario 6, where the friendship was seen to be prioritized above all else. 
One pupil's sole comment on this scenario was: "What a wonderful friend!". 
Through examining the type of language used- its function and its consequences- one 
can see that very definite senses of identity exist in the school. The individualistic and 
collectivistic pupils will clash, as their discourses revealed very different rules. Yet, it is 
the ensembled-individualists who seem to be creating a new moral order, in their at-
tempts to find a middle road between the two. 
7.2.2. School B 
The pupils from the second school are part of a small, rural Afrikaans community in the 
Orange Free State, in which the moral order and rules would be concerned with the 
good of the society, precisely because it is small and fairly isolated. Traditionally, also, 
Afrikaans communities are collectively and group oriented. In keeping with this, the 
majority of the pupils exhibited a collectivistic sense of identity. However, one quarter of 
the pupils were individualistically oriented, perhaps reflecting the dominant white western 
sense of identity that is frequently presented as an ideal in South Africa. A small percent-
age of the pupils appeared to be ensembled-individualists. All the pupils were Afrikaans 
speaking, a language which reflects the group identity of the population. 
An interesting feature of this sub-sample was their tendency to give very definite 
answers. In other words, few chose to neither agree nor disagree with the actions in the 
scenarios. They either firmly disagreed, or agreed. It was only on closer inspection of 
116 
the responses, that a few ensembled-individualist persons were identified. These very 
definite views may be due to the fact that this community has had a relatively stable 
moral order, in which few changes, apart from modernization, have occured in the last 
decades. The population and social environment has not undergone any transforma-
tions, nor is it in the process of radical change. 
A number of rules pertaining to a collective sense of identity can be identified. The 
responses to the first two scenarios outlined the fact that the individual never comes first. 
One must always think of others, and reflect on the consequences of one's actions as 
concerns other people. For example, "ander mense het ook gevoelens", "sy kan nie net 
wil uitmaak soos sy wil nie" and "doen wat jy aan jouself gedoen wil he". Further, it is im-
portant not to abuse people's trust in one, for example, '~y het vir ]an verraai". A very 
collective concept that was manifested, was the strong belief in God, and his all control-
ling prescence. Many of the responses to scenario 1 said that the girl should have 
asked for guidance from God before doing anything, for example, "dan tot die Here bid". 
This was followed by a rule that one must always respect one's elders and superiors, no 
matter what. Thus, in scenario 2, it was seen as bad manners and disrespectful to inter-
rupt a teacher: "dit is slegte maniere. Dit sal ook jou houding wys teenoor jy ouers en 
groter mense as jy". Thus an authority rule is present. 
Scenarios 3, 4, 5 and 6 all reflected the general attitude of thinking about others and the 
good of the group first. Praise was given to the girl in scenario 3 for not disturbing the 
group, and criticism levelled against the girl in scenario 4 for abandoning her friend. 
There are moral undertones present, for example, '~y moet haar medemens liefhe". Fur-
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ther, one should always consider the consequences of actions, for example, ''sy sal haar 
nog meer teneerdruk". One must always try to prevent ( "verhoed'? problems in relation-
ships by thinking of the other person first. 
Scenario 5 brought three interesting rules to light. Firstly, men were seen as dominant, 
and as having the right to decide. Secondly, people were on the whole seen as passive 
victims. This leads to an idea that they are not always capable of exerting self-control 
and cannot be responsible for themselves. For example, ''miskien het sy (weer) meer 
van Adam gehou en vir Dirk gelos (omdat Dirk nie daar was nie om haar dop te hou)''. All 
these are collective concepts, and point to a collective sense of identity among these 
pupils. Finally, the responses received in scenario 6 summarized the general feeling of 
thinking about other people first, and not hurting anybody. For example, "n Mens moet 
ook na jou medemens kyk en nie net na jou self nie", ''sy het positief opgetree" and ''sy 
was nederig en nie hoogmoedig nie". Thus one was never presumed to put oneself first, 
and should always be humble and considerate. 
In direct contrast to the collective rules, those who showed an individualistic sense of 
identity insisted that individuals have rights that come before others. One must be in 
control, and responsible for oneself, not for other people. Therefore, in scenario l the 
following sentiments were outlined: "elke mens het sy eie vrye wif' and "want sy kan uit-
gaan met wie sy wil". Or, in scenario 2, ''hy het die volste reg", and in scenario 3, "as jy 
dringend met iemand moet praat dan moet jy praat''. Further, one pupil even said that it 
is wrong to think of others as more important than yourself: ''sy ag haar vriend 
belangriker as haarself''. Another example of how important an individual is, was given in 
scenario 6: "Lena moet haar eie ding kan doen, sonder dat Annelize dit beinvloed". 
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The few pupils who reflected an ensembled-individualist sense of identity saw reciprocity 
as a crucial rule in society. Communication and mutual trust was seen as important. It 
was felt that one should always justify one's actions rather than just carrying them out. 
Further, discussion should precede actions. The idea of reciprocity is followed through, 
for example, by one pupil who observed that if one partner did not carry out his duties in 
a relationship, then the other did not have to either: '~y moes na die partyjie toe gegaan 
het, en haar nie aan Dirk gesteur nie, want hy het nie die reg gehad om haar aJJeen te 
laat gaan nie". One very good illustration of the conflict between collectivism and in-
dividualism was given by a pupil in response to scenario 6 when she noted: '~y was reg 
om die onderwyser te vra of Annelize ook n rol kon kry. Sy moes egter nie geweier het 
om voort te gaan met die toneelstuk nie". Thus, there is deferment to authority present, 
but, one's own needs are also seen as being relevant. 
7.2.3. School C 
The third school was an isolated farm school not far from the Lesotho border, and all the 
pupils were SeSotho speaking. It was felt that this community would still be traditionally 
and collectively oriented. However, these findings (such as could be discerned) point to 
a change in the sense of identity that exists, as the majority of the pupils were classified 
as being of the ensembled-individualistic type, and just under a quarter of the pupils ex-
hibited individualism as their sense of identity. None were classified as collectively 
oriented. It thus seems that the western influence is far greater than it appears to be in 
this community. The reasons for this, and the type of influences, need to be thoroughly 
investigated. 
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Unfortunately, written text as a method of discourse analysis failed in this school. The 
pupils did respond to the scenarios, but once these responses had been translated and 
back-translated, it was apparent that they had simply repeated the actions in the 
scenarios, and whether they agreed or disagreed with them, for example, "it is good". 
These problems were probably experienced because this community is illiterate, with an 
oral tradition. Further, the teachers explained that the pupils received little support for 
literacy in their community, as they were expected to become farm labourers. The 
researcher also observed in the two days spent at the school, that the children were not 
encouraged to express themselves or to ask questions. Rote learning and mechanical 
copying of passages was common in all the classes. 
In future, when working with this kind of community or school, it is felt that conversations 
and group discussions should be held. These would then be taped, transcribed and 
translated. It is clear that written texts are an inappropriate method for obtaining the 
relevent information from this group. 
Where information was forthcoming, it was clear that the majority of the pupils favoured 
the individual's right in terms of the good of the group. That is, they exhibited 
ensembled-individualism as their sense of identity. It was important to always consider 
other people and the consequences of actions. Few of the pupils outrightly agreed or 
disagreed with the actions. They appeared ambivalent, and could seldom give reasons 
for this. Where individualism was present as the sense of identity, the pupils reiterated 
that a person could do what he liked to further his own goals and to satisfy his own 
needs. 
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The next surprising finding however, was that none of the pupils appeared to exhibit a 
completely collective sense of identity. This is perhaps due to the fact that, on enquiry, it 
became apparent that this is not a stable population (as compared to School B). People 
continually move in and out of the group, and western influences are brought in. There 
is thus a great need to investigate further how this society is constructed, what rules are 
operating on the people, and finally, therefore, the type of sense of identity that is 
present. 
7 .2.4. School D 
This school was potentially the most interesting school. It is a private school in 1 ohan-
nesburg which has been fully integrated for a number of years. Further, the method of 
education practiced is one that retains aspects of traditional western methods, as well as 
incorporating traditional collectivistic concepts. It was felt that the moral order and rules 
present in the school would reflect a meeting of these two senses of identity. This was 
supported by the findings, in that the majority of the pupils appeared to have 
ensembled-individualism as their sense of identity. These ensembled-individualist pupils 
were composed of different language and ethnic groups (English, Afrikaans, Mandarin, 
Tswana and Zulu), and only one of them had had been at the school for less than a year. 
Thus, it appears that the mixing of pupils from different backgrounds is resulting in a new 
moral order with new rules that exhibit aspects of both traditional senses of identity. 
121 
-
The majority of the pupils who had an individualistic sense of identity were English. 
However, it is interesting to note that 1 Sotho speaking and 1 Xhosa speaking pupil both 
exhibited an individualistic sense of identity. In addition, they had both been at the 
school for a few years, and had therefore been extensively exposed to western view-
points. Only 3 of the pupils had a collective sense of identity, and 2 were not English 
speaking. (They spoke either Sotho or Tsonga.) One had been at the school for less 
than 2 years. Again, Munro's (1986) findings that a traditional sense of identity is 
retained in the face of an alien culture is applicable. Also, it may be that as yet, the in-
dividuals have not embarked on identity projects to fit in with the dominant moral order. 
Those pupils who were ensembled-individualists saw themselves as relevant, but only 
once other people and the group had been considered. The consequences of one's ac-
tions are always important and should not be forgotten. Further, although one should 
always consider other people, one needs to bear the responsibility for one's actions. 
One crucial rule is that of communication and explanation of behaviour. One needs to 
be "open" and allow for mutual decision making. Actions should always be justifiable and 
not conducted for oneself alone. Thus, for example, in scenario 1 ''Susan has the right to 
choose", but, she should have talked it over. Two examples from scenario 2 show how 
the individual is considered important, but only if the consequences of his actions are not 
detrimental to others: ''Eric's persistency is admirable, but .•. " and ''Eric is allowed to do as 
he likes, but ... ". 
Sharing and reciprocity are emphasized in scenarios 3 and 4. An example of this is the 
method by which one pupil described what should have happened in scenario 3: "Jenny 
shouldn't have worried whether she spoilt their evening because if they were her real 
122 
friends they wouldn't mind". Similarly in scenario 4, the girl's actions were understood in 
terms of an altruistic motive. That is, she did what she did, not because she didn't want 
anything to do with her friend, but rather, because she was trying to help her friend come 
to her senses and realise what she was doing to herself. 
The ensembled-individualist rules again highlighted in scenarios 5 and 6, were that 
reciprocal trust was important, and discussing one's point of view was essential. Fur-
ther, one is required to be both ''supportive" and "understanding" rather than ''sacrificial" 
in terms of friendships and love relationships. 
Those pupils who displayed an individualistic sense of identity were vociferous in their 
support of the individual's rights and feelings. For example, in scenario 1, she ''had every 
right to go out with both of them", "she can do what she wants", and it was good that 
"she acted on her feelings". The responses to scenarios 2 and 3 provided additional 
support for this, for example, ''he had the right" to ask questions, and ''Jenny had every 
right to speak to someone even at another person's expense". It appears that pro-activity 
is valued, as well as individual responisibility. Therefore, in scenario 4, the friend "was 
justified in washing her hands of someone else's problems". One should be in control all 
the time, and not allow anyone else to make decisions for one. Examples of this were 
found in responses to scenario 5: "she can take care of herselr', "not be bullied into 
making decisions" and ''she should not let him rule her life". It is important to retain a 
sense of the person one is, and not let one's integrity be compromised in any way, for 
example, ''shouldn't have had to compromise herself". Thus there is a reliance on 
oneself. Further, in scenario 6 the rules appear to be that one should always look after 
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oneself first, and not deny one's talent or abilities because of another person. For ex-
ample, "she should have thought about her own feelings first" and "soft people must learn 
to do things for themselves". 
Finally, the pupils who had a collective sense of identity exhibited many of the same rules 
that collectively oriented pupils in the other schools did. One does not have a moral right 
to think of oneself first. Friendships are not to be interfered with. In scenario 2, the boy 
was described as "selfish and arrogant" for demanding attention. Similarly, in scenario 3, 
"one should not disrupt others' enjoyment". In scenario 5, the girl was regarded as a 
"very admirable person" with ''phenomenal grace and understanding" and a "fantastically 
strong person to be able to act with such selflessness". Further, patriarchy, very often a 
feature of collective societies, was identified as being part of life by 1 pupil, and not to be 
challenged: "but male dominance is part of life". Again, in the last scenario, sacrifice in 
terms of a friend is praised, for example, "friendship is more important than glittering 
glamour and attention". Authority is also respected and not questioned, for example, 
"the teacher in charge obviously knew (what was correct) ... (they) just had to accept it". 
7.2.5. A Comparison 
In the two integrated schools it is interesting to note that in the school which has a long 
history of openess and integration (School D), ensembled-individualism is the present 
construction of sense of identity for the majority of the pupils. Change is a constant, and 
there is obviously negotiation between the pupils. A far more holistic viewpoint is 
present when compared to School A, where, although it is clear that different groups are 
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having an interactive effect on each other, individualism still predominates in the moral 
order, and in the rules expressed by the pupils. Finally, the unexpected differences in 
sense of identity between Schools B and C, calls for further investigation. That School B 
was outrightly collective may be due to the fact that it is part of a fairly stable, rural 
population. Whereas School C, although still part of an isolated rural population, is 
simultaneously subject to the influences of a western world, and the breakdown of tradi-
tional identities and societies. In -displaying ensembled-individualism as a sense of iden-
tity, the pupils were showing how they are caught between the two. 
7 .3. INTERNAL VALIDITY 
Radical changes have occurred in our understanding of science in the last few decades. 
The traditional and fundamental distinction between observations and theoretical state-
ments has been thrown into doubt by people such.as Popper (1959) and Kuhn (1962). It 
is now taken for granted that observation of the physical or social world is imbued with 
theoretical interpretation (Potter & Wetherall, 1987). Thus, even the most basic scientific 
explanation is based on some kind of theoretical assumptions. Complete objectivity 
therefore does not exist. Similarly, the idea of experimental objectivity has been criticised 
through the work of Collins ( 1985) and Mulkay ( 1986) on replication. 
Psychologists have always tried to compare psychology with the natural sciences, and 
have clung to the positivistic doctrines of objectivity and replicability. However, the 
criticisms against traditional positivism have called this reliance into question, and have 
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opened the way for the development of new methodologies and disciplines (Harre, 
1983). This study was undertaken from within an acceptance of such criticism. There-
fore, traditional concepts of validity are not applicable to the results. 
However, Potter and Wetherall (1987) have outlined 4 dimensions which can be used to 
validate the findings of discourse analysis. They are: coherence, participants' orienta-
tion, new problems, and fruitfulness. 
Coherence: 
Firstly, a set of analytic claims should give coherence to a body of discourse. Thus, we 
should be able to see how discourse fits together and how discursive structure produces 
effects and functions. This was outlined in the discussion on the individual schools, and 
it was clear that coherence was achieved. Patterns and coherence were identified 
throughout the discourses of pupils who reflected the same sense of identity. 
Participants' Orientation: 
Secondly, discourse analysis regards the orientation of the participants as more impor-
tant than actual analysis or coding. What the participants see as consistent and different 
is relevent. The discussion focused entirely on the participants' rules and sense of iden-
tity- on how they used language to elucidate this. Also, it was noted that different pupils 
saw things differently and again, examples of how this was expressed were given. 
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New Problems: 
The third aspect of validity is that in clarifying linguistic resources, new problems should 
be identified. This was clearly done in this study. Firstly, problems were experienced in 
School C, where a literate culture is not the norm. New methods need to be identified to 
deal with this. Secondly, as far as the actual purpose of the study (a hypothesis-
generating one) was concerned, different senses of identity were identified in the 
schools. The question now arises as to how they develop, are maintained, and are sub-
ject to change. Discourse analysis will provide an excellent method for investigating 
these problems. Thirdly, we need to investigate if identity projects are used by those 
pupils in the same moral order, who have different senses of identity. How these identity 
projects function and develop needs to be identified. 
Fruitfulness: 
The final criterion for validity is the fruitfulness of the analytic scheme. That is, has sense 
been made of the discourse, and have novel explanations been generated. This study 
certainly identified the discourse, and tried to make sense of it. In addition, explanations 
of the results were attempted, and new problems were identified. 
Potter and Wetherall (1987) claim that these four dimensions for validating the findings of 
discourse analysis within itself allow for examination of any of the claims. Thus, although 
external validity is not achieved, internal validity certainly is. It is often suggested that 
qualitative research is less rigorous than the standard alternative. This is not so. Con-
stant re-examination of the process, the researcher's theoretical orientation and the data 
took place. Furthermore, there is no infallible research, as noted by the critics of tradi-
tional research. Rather, a new method of analysis has been identified and attempted, 
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with interesting and provocative results, that are particularly relevent to the current social 
climate in South Africa. Discourse analysis has radical implications for our understand-
ing and interpretation of data. Much work still has to be done in this epistemology before 
the methods and processes are refined. 
However, if further studies are undertaken it would be important to negotiate meaning 
with respondents in order to ensure a critical stance. Also, analysis of text by more than 
one researcher is advocated, upon which a final negotiation of meaning can be under-
taken. 
One further restriction of this study was that analysis was forced in that it was undertaken 
from a Sampsonian point of view. The aim was to find support for Sampson's ideas of 
ensembled-individualism. 
Finally, future research needs to take account of the influence of greater subtleties 
operating within the social environment. For example, the influence of the rule system 
operating within pupils' home environments needs to identified. Thereafter, one needs 
to identify the extent to which this has an influence on the rules expressed by the pupils 
at school. This was unfortunately beyond the scope of this dissertation, and is recog-
nised as a limitaion on the results presented. 
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7.4. CONCEPTUAL CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE STUDY: FROM DISCOURSE TO UN-
DERSTANDING 
Through an analysis of the discourse presented by the pupils, this study attempted to 
contribute to the understanding of what kind of sense of identity is currently developing 
in South Africa as the moral orders and rules change. No hypotheses were presented at 
the beginning of the study. Instead, the aim was for it to be a hypothesis-generating 
study. An idea has now been established as to the kind of senses of identity existing and 
operating within various schools. Hypotheses can thus be formulated which encourage 
further investigation. 
This study has contributed to the understanding of the context of social reality in the 
schools. This social reality is constantly being reconstructed, and negotiated by the in-
dividuals in their social environments. The social reality in Schools A, C, and Dis one of 
change, and this is emphasized by the rise of an ensembled-individualistic sense of iden-
tity. In contrast, School B appears relatively stable, with a social reality that is secure and 
known. Further, the study has implications for a broad social environment- that of South 
Africa. We need to know if similar social constructions of reality are occuring in South 
African society as a whole. 
In terms of Harre's idea of a sense of identity that results from rules and the prevailing 
moral order, this study has real value. It is apparent that the moral order in South Africa 
is changing as new political, economic and social settlements are negotiated. This has 
profound implications in the long term for individuals. As the traditional base or moral 
order of South Africa falls away, new rules will have to develop to ensure an ordered and 
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adequately functioning society. Thus, rules will change, and as a result, an individual's 
sense of identity will also be affected. The aim is now to identify what rules exist in both 
macro and micro levels of South African society, how they function, and what their effect 
is on individuals. Psychology's contribution should lie in trying to identify the subtle rules 
that are operating in the diverse moral orders of this society. 
Furthermore, it will be necessary to identify whether or not South Africa is moving toward 
a society with a norm of intersubjective beliefs, a more spiritually and socially whole 
society. Lonergan (1958) notes that any society strives to develop communion within, 
and between all its elements. It appears that in the integrated schools, this is happening, 
with the development of ensembled-individualism as the sense of identity that encom-
passes aspects of all traditional (black and white) groups in society. The question now 
is: to what extent is this occuring in other domains of South African life, and is South 
African society as a whole moving toward a new correlative dimension? 
7 .5. CONCLUSION 
The question that arises from this study concerns what is happening to sense of identity 
in a society that is undergoing radical transformation. The methodology used in the 
study (discourse analysis) can lead to a greater understanding of the kind of transforma-
tions that are taking place. Linguistic structures will reflect this, and discourses between 
people and groups will show how they perceive themselves, and others. Further, the 
way one person or group talks, will directly influence what is said in response. 
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Thus, a very practical example of this would be to analyze discourse between the ANC, 
Inkatha and the Nationalist Party Government. By doing this, we should be able to iden-
tify the function and purpose of negotiation language. It should be possible to gain 
clarity on why negotiations are breaking down, and further, why the different groups 
have different and apparantly incompatible needs. Such research could be taken to 
micro levels as well, whereby ordinary talk amongst individuals in South Africa could be 
analysed. Similarly, discourse could reflect identity, social rules, and social processes. 
Various new research and hypotheses are generated by this study. Firstly, it can be 
hypothesized that ensembled-individualism is developing as the future sense of identity 
held by all South Africans in response to a clash between, presumably, individualistic 
and collectivistic cultures. Secondly, it can be hypothesized that more stable sub-
populations will be less likely to change their sense of identity. Thirdly, and unexpec-
tedly, it seems that traditional black rural societies no longer hold a fully collective sense 
of identity. Fourthly, it can be stated that language affects sense of identity. Fifthly, it is 
suggested that sense of identity in South Africa seems to be undergoing constant 
change and negotiation. 
The hypotheses suggested above, if researched, could contribute to an understanding 
of the processes which are at the present part of a changing society. South Africans 
seem to be embarking on identity projects which could create a new moral order. We 
need, through discourse analysis, to investigate the nature of identity projects which are 
being constructed by people and groups in South Africa. 
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This study has achieved its aim by generating new questions and hypotheses about 
what is happening in social and personal realities in South Africa. It is hoped that further 
study in this mode will be conducted to fully identify and understand how social nego-
tiation and settlement in this country will occur, and finally, how a new social reality will 
be constructed. 
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APPENDIX A: EXAMPLES OF RESPONSES TO THE SCENARIOS 
Presented below are complete examples of responses to the scenarios. 
Some of those that were coded as individualistic responses were: 
Scenario 1: 
"I don't think that Susan should be worried about the other friendship. If she was bored 
she feel obliged to break-up." (Subject 23, School A) 
Scenario 5: 
"She should have gone to the party and enjoy herself with her friends. She knew that she 
does not love Adam and he do not have the right to can go and force her to be friends 
again as he still loves her. She can do what she wanted to do. If she had gone to the 
party and he tried to force her to be his best friend again - I can give her the right to can 
clap him or tell some friends to stop him. If that was the reason for not going there. If the 
reason for not going is that Craig is not going and he does not like her to have fun with 
her friends without him then it is also wrong." (Subject 1, School A) 
Scenario 6: 
"Relationships are not based on if one does something then the other must." (Subject 5, 
School A) 
Some complete responses that were coded as collectivistic are: 
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Scenario 2: 
''Nee, ek dink nie so nie want dit is verkeerd om n klas to onderbreek wanner n onder-
wyser besig is om te praat. Dit is slegte maniere. Dit sal jou houding wys teenoor jy 
ouers en groter mense as jy. "(Subject 6, School B) 
Scenario 3: 
"One should not disrupt others' enjoyment for the sake of one's own misery." (Subject 3, 
School D) 
Scenario 6: 
"Sy was n baie goeie vriendin om ook aan Annelize to dink. Niemand het toe seergekry 
nie. "(Subject 12, School B) 
Examples of complete responses that were coded as ensembled-individualism are: 
Scenario 2: 
''Eric had the opportunity to ask his teachers about things. The students shouldn't have 
deprived him. And at some point teachers and pupils do get aggravated so I think they 
should just have a talk with the pupil." (Subject 7, School D) 
Scenario 4: 
"The reason why I say this is because by her best friend telling her this, she would have 
been quickly awakened and made to realise that her life was in a mess." (Subject 25, 
School D) 
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Scenario 5: 
"She should have gone to the party to prove to Craig that she was no longer interested in 
Adam. Both of them missed the point with this incident. They should have trusted each 
other." (Subject 24, School D) 
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APPENDIX B: CODING AND ANALYSIS 
The coding form was as follows: 
SUBJECT NUMBER: 
RULES: 
PATTERNS: 
DIFFERENCES: __________________________________________ _ 
CONSISTENCIES: ________________________________________ _ 
EXAMPLES: 
CONCLUSION: ______________ _ 
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Examples of coding are: 
Example 1: (Subject 25, School D) 
This subject expressed individualistic values in five out of six responses. The sixth 
response was coded as ensembled-individualism. Thus, rules that were identified 
across the scenarios were that the individual is important above all others, and that it is 
his right to demand attention and do what he I she wants. For example, in scenario 1 
the subject responded: "she was right because she thought about what she was feeling 
and acted upon it!'. Similarly, in scenario 2, the subject responded: "he is right to do so 
because I feel that his wanting to learn should not be hindered by what other people 
think''. Again, in scenario 5 the individual was emphasized: "she shouldn't have had to 
compromise herself in that way''. Thus, a pattern of individualistic values was identified. 
However, an inconsistency arose in scenario 4. While the subjct indicated that she 
thought that the person had done the right thing (indicating an individualist orientation) 
she explained that the person's actions had an altruistic effect: "by her best friend telling 
her this she would have been quickly awakened and made to realize that her life was a 
mess". These patterns were noted and analysed, and ultimaltely led to the conclusion 
that on the whole the subject was individualistically oriented. 
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Example 2: (Subject 6, School B) 
This subject stressed collective values in all but one of her responses. The rules that 
· were identified in the scenarios were that one must always think of other people first, and 
that relationships are a vital part of life which cannot be ignored when an individual wants 
something that could possibly harm a relationship. Thus, for example, in scenario 1, the 
subject responded that "dit bet twee maats n band tussen mekaar gebring'. Similarly, in 
scenario 4, she said: "Nee, sy moet luister na haar vriendin se probleme. n Vriend is daar 
om te help". And finally, in scenario 6: "sy bet positief opgetree en sy bet belang 
gestel .. sy was nederig en nie hoogmoedig nie". 
Scenario 3 presented what appeared to be an inconsistency in the responses. The sub-
ject responded that the person had done the wrong thing (thus on the surface appearing 
to advocate individualistic values). However, her response put a different light on the 
picture. She said "jou beste vriendin is daar om te help en a an jou raad to sken!C'. Thus, 
she emphasized that relationships are important, and that one must always consider 
other people. Ultimately, she is expressing her collective orientation. 
Example 3: (Subject 7, School D) 
This subject was classified as an ensembled-individualist. The rules that were outlined 
were that one should always justify and explain one's actions, and not just act; and, one 
has individual rights, but one must be careful not to impinge on others' rights, or hurt 
other people. For example, in scenario 1 the subject responded "she should have told 
her previous boyfriend that she was leaving and not just dropped him". In scenario 3, he 
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agreed that the pupil had the right to ask questions, but "at some points teachers and 
pupils do get aggravated so I think they should just have a talk with the pupil'. Finally, in 
scenario 6 he responded: "She did the right thing ... but she should have taken the part 
instead'. 
Thus, a pattern was established in all the scenarios that individuals should always think 
of others, but not to the detriment of themselves. The function of this is to emphasize 
ensembled-individualistic values in a moral order that is open and integrated, in which 
different groups must co-exist in an ordered way. 
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APPENDIXC 
In this appendix, an example is given of how one response was broken down and 
coded. The response was given in answer to scenario 1 by subject number 23 in School 
D. It was coded as reflecting an individualistic sense of identity. 
"I dont't think that Susan should be worried about the other friendship. If she was bored 
she feel obliged to break up." 
This was broken down into phrases, and a conclusion was drawn from this: 
"I don't think"- an agreement with the individualistic actions in the scenarios: verbs and 
adverbs show this 
"that Susan should be worried"- other peoples' friendships are not her concern 
"about the other friendship."- indicating that the actions are justified 
"If she was bored"- the adverb used here is used to justify her actions 
''she feel obliged to break up."- again, the use of verbs and adverbs indicates a justifica-
tion of the person's activities and agreement with individualism. 
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